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Abstract 
Organizational change has remained an important subject for many researchers in the field of 
organization theory. We propose the importance of organizational liability of renewal
1
 through a model 
that examines how an organization within the Saudi Arabian railway sector can overcome potential 
rigidities in organizational capabilities from learning by changing those capabilities. We examine whether 
organizations within the railway sector can overcome the liability of renewal by changes in organizational 
capabilities. 
We develop a model of organizational renewal utilizing researches from various management schools 
of thought, such as Institutional Economics, Population Ecology, and Organizational Learning. Our 
model relates how changes in legitimacy and performance affect pressure for change on an organization. 
Further, our model relates how the organizational renewal process reflects on the balance between the 
dynamic aspect of organizational learning as demonstrated by changes in capabilities and the stabilizing 
aspects of organizational inertia.  
 In this study we are examining two organizations within the Saudi Arabian railway sector. We 
analyze the Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) in terms of its freight and passenger operation from 2001-
                                                             
1
 The liability of renewal, in our case, can be defined as whenever an old established organization tries to minimize 
errors to re-gain legitimacy throughout a process of organizational learning from changes in capabilities which aims 
to improve its performance. During the renewal process the organization risk of failure in implementing new routines 
increases. This increased risk of failure, we refer to as the liability of renewal.   
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2014 and also the freight operation at the Saudi Railway Company (SAR) from 2011-2014. We also 
expect that the new entrant SAR creates an environmental (institutional) turbulence or change that has an 
impact on the existing organization SRO. So we examine SRO before and after SAR’s entrance into the 
Saudi Arabian railway sector. We found support for our model in that most of our results were in the 
hypothesized direction. We found that learning from changes in organizational capability has a positive 
effect on performance. Also legitimacy has a positive effect on performance. We also found that 
performance and legitimacy have a negative relationship with pressure for change. Finally, we found that 
environmental (institutional) turbulence or change has an impact on the already established organization.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgment 
As my four-year journey studying PhD in the field of management comes to an end, there are so 
many people I would like to thank, for they have helped me make the most out of this journey. At the 
forefront is the Saudi Arabian Government and the pervious King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz, may Allah have mercy on his soul, and for his brother our King now, King 
Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz, may Allah bless him, for giving me the opportunity to pursue my postgraduate 
studies through the King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz Scholarship Program. Also, I would like to thank the 
previous Minister of Transport, Mr. Gebara Bin Eid and the new Minister Abdullah Al Muqbel, for 
facilitating my access to all the data needed in this paper. 
I am forever indebted to my dissertation chair, advisor, mentor and friend Professor David Methe’ for 
his exceptional guidance, inspiration and patience. I would also like to thank Professor Schumpeter 
Tamada and emeritus Professor Masao Nakanishi for their suggestions and support throughout my 
research.  Finally, a heartfelt thanks goes to my big family for the continuous emotional and family 
support. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 Table of Contents 
List of Maps ............................................................................................................................................. 6 
List of Charts ............................................................................................................................................ 7 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................... 8 
Table of figures ........................................................................................................................................ 9 
Chapter 1 .............................................................................................................................................. 10 
1- The History of the Railways ........................................................................................................... 10 
2- The History of the Railway in Arabian Peninsula ........................................................................... 12 
3- The Importance of the Saudi Railway Transportation Nowadays .................................................... 14 
4- The Saudi Railway organization SRO ............................................................................................ 16 
5- The Saudi Railway Company (SAR) .............................................................................................. 20 
6- The Institutional Change and the Expanding Project ...................................................................... 22 
7- Introduction to the Problem Statement and Research Question ....................................................... 28 
8- Introduction of the Main Idea of This Study ................................................................................... 34 
Chapter 2 .............................................................................................................................................. 37 
1- Literature Review and Hypotheses Development ........................................................................... 37 
1.1. Railway System and Organizational Change, Empirical Studies on Railways Systems ................... 37 
1.2. Institutional Economics and the Organizational Change ................................................................. 40 
1.3. Population Ecology and Organizational Change: ............................................................................ 42 
1.4. Organizational Learning and Organizational Change under the Pressure for Change ...................... 45 
5 
 
2- Conceptual Model and Propositions ............................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 3 .............................................................................................................................................. 52 
1- Methodology and Analysis Development ....................................................................................... 52 
2- Difference Equation Model ............................................................................................................ 53 
3- The Time Variation for SRO / Pre-SAR and Post-SAR Entry ......................................................... 56 
Chapter 4 .............................................................................................................................................. 58 
1- Results ........................................................................................................................................... 58 
2- Discussion...................................................................................................................................... 76 
1- General Results Discussion ............................................................................................................ 76 
2- SRO the Period of Pre and Post SAR Entry Discussion .................................................................. 77 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 82 
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 87 
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 88 
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................................. 89 
Appendix 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 90 
Appendix 5 ............................................................................................................................................. 91 
Appendix 6 ............................................................................................................................................. 92 
Appendix 7 ............................................................................................................................................. 93 
 
6 
 
List of Maps 
Name of Map Page 
Map 1:  Hijaz Railway. 14 
Map 2: The Saudi Future Railway Network Map. 15 
Map 3: Operated and Under Construction Line for SAR. 22 
Map 4: Haramian High Speed Railway. 24 
Map 5: The Land-bridge Line. 25 
Map 6: GCC Railway. 27 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
List of Charts 
Chart Name Page 
Chart 1: Tons of Freight SRO. 17 
Chart 2: Total Number of Moved Wagons between Riyadh and Dammam SRO. 18 
Chart 3:Number of Freight Trips SRO. 18 
Chart 4: Number of Passenger SRO. 19 
Chart 5: Number of Passenger Trips SRO. 20 
Chart 6: Tons of Freight SAR. 21 
Chart 7: Number of Moved Wagons SAR.  21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
List of Tables 
Table Name Page 
Table 1: GCC Current Transportation and Expected by Train. 26 
Table 2 Entrepreneurial Strategies to Promote new Industry Development.    
Aldrich and Fiol 1994. 
31 
Table 3: Renewable Strategies to Promote old Industry Re-development. 32 
Table 4: The Relationships among Variables and Our Measures. 57 
Table 5: The Saudi Railway Company SAR, the Result of Equation 1. 59 
Table 6: The Saudi Railway Organization SRO, the Result of Equation 1. 60 
Table 7: The Saudi Railway Company SAR, the Result of Equation 2. 61 
Table 8: The Saudi Railway Organization SRO the Result of Equation 2. 62 
Table 9: The Saudi Railway Company SAR, the Result of Equation 3. 63 
Table 10: The Saudi Railway Organization SRO, the Result of Equation 3. 65 
Table 11 SRO 2001- 2005, the Period of Per-SAR Entry Equation 1. 66 
Table 12: SRO 2001- 2005 the Period of Per-SAR Entry Equation 2. 68 
Table 13: SRO 2001- 2005 the Period of Per-SAR Entry Equation 3. 69 
Table 14: SRO 2006- 2014 the Period of Post-SAR Entry equation1. 71 
Table 15: SRO 2006- 2014 the Period of Post-SAR Entry equation 2. 73 
Table 16: SRO 2006- 2014 the Period of Post-SAR Entry equation 3. 74 
Table 17: SRO the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 1. 78 
Table 18: SRO the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 1. 78 
Table 19: SRO the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 2. 79 
Table 20: SRO the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 2.  79 
Table 21: SRO the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 3. 80 
Table 22: SRO the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 3.  80 
 
9 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Name of figure Page 
Figure 1: The Structure of the Railway Sector in Saudi Arabia. 23 
Figure 2: Institution Timeline of the Railway in Saudi Arabia for SRO and SAR. 27 
Figure 3: The Development of Railway’s Operators SRO and SAR. 30 
Figure 4: The Relationship between Legitimacy, Performance, and Pressure for 
Change. 
 
41 
Figure 5: A Capability-Based Learning Integrative Framework. 46 
Figure 6: The Relationship between Inertia, Learning from Changes in 
Organizational Capabilities and Performance. 
47 
Figure 7: The Conceptual Model. 51 
Figure 9: The Relationship Measured by Equation 1.  54 
Figure 10: The Relationship Measured by Equation 2. 55 
Figure 11: The Relationship Measured by Equation 3. 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Chapter 1 
-  Introduction 
The railway industry is known as one of the main transportation tools that can sustain an economy 
and develop countries. This industry has developed in the last two centuries and advanced countries keep 
pushing its technology to the limit to improve the railways sector. Japan can be an example of these 
countries, where you can find the Shinkansen or (the Bullet-train) which has a top speed of 300 km/h. 
Nowadays, Japan is about to introduce a new Maglev train (derived from magnetic levitation) which has a 
top speed of 603 km/h.  
To understand how the railway industry has developed, in this section we examine the historical 
background of the railway industry’s development. Then we turn our attention to the first railway system 
in the Arabian Peninsula as well as to the current railway system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the 
end of this section we discuss the main idea of this study.  
1- The History of the Railways 
- Rail Track Development 
MacFadyen (2013) studied the history of the British railway system and his study discussed the start 
of the idea of the rail track and railway rolling stock development. According to his study, running 
vehicles along a track started long time ago and this idea goes back to Ancient Greece. At that time tracks 
were worn into rock by wagons which were moved by hand or animal. The passage of wheeled vehicles, 
at the time of Ancient Romans, used sets of long smooth stones on their road.  The wooden railed wagon 
ways appeared by the 16
th
 century which were used to move small trucks.  In 1722, and as one of the 
earliest railways in Scotland which was the Tranent to Cockenzie Waggonway, was established. This 
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horse-drawn line used wooden rails and it was a 2 ½ mile long route for mine wagons in East Lothian 
(MacFadyen 2013).  
In the early 1800s, Britain was to pioneer the steam railway and remain the world leader in railway 
development for over 150 years. In the late 18th century, Benjamin Outram developed the railway with 
the use of L-shaped iron rails. Along with the railway development, an engineer called William Jessop 
had made up from cast iron a type of rail which was flat on top. These were used in conjunction with 
wheels which had a flange on their inside edges which allowed the wheels to stay on the track 
(MacFadyen 2013). 
 
- Rolling Stock Engine Development  
In 1712 and regarding power generation, an engineer called Thomas Newcomen invented the first 
practical pumping engine powered by steam and it was subsequently used to pump water out of mines up 
and down England. On the other hand, in 1803 Richard Trevithick built the world's first steam locomotive. 
When the Stockton and Darlington Railway was opened in 1825, it featured the first steam powered 
engine railway for passenger trafficking. A civil and mechanical engineer from the North of England 
called George Stephenson together with his son Robert Stephenson invented the locomotive which 
influenced British railways for the next few years (MacFadyen 2013). 
Obstacles such as a peat bog known as Chat Moss were overcome by Stephenson’s design by having 
the railway line float over the seemingly bottomless peat bog on a base of heather, branches and moss. 
Stephenson, the “Father of Railways”, as he was known among other people in the business, also 
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developed the civil engineering on the railways. He, and later his son, were responsible of creating the 
engines for the trains. On the Stockton and Darlington line, “Locomotion” took the lead as the first 
locomotive constructed on that line. However, the best engine known for Stephenson at that time was the 
“Rocket”. It proved its power on the Rainhill Trials where there was a competition set up to provide 
locomotives for the Liverpool to Manchester route. The engine in principle was designed by Robert 
Stephenson with some recommendations given from his father. During the contest, ten locomotives were 
presented, five of which got the acceptance to participate in the line and they were; Sans Pareil, Cycloped, 
Novelty, Perseverance, and Rocket. Cycloped was powered with a horse walking on a treadmill while the 
others were powered by steam. Only the Rocket was able to get to the finish line (MacFadyen 2013). 
2- The History of the Railway in Arabian Peninsula  
- Hejaz Railway  
Here, we examine the first railway system in the Arabian Peninsula, where we discuss the Ottoman 
Railway line called the Hejaz Railway. At that time, it was planned by the Ottoman Empire to facilitate 
pilgrimage transportation to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.  The idea of constructing a railway in 
the Hejaz region was first put forward by a German-American engineer, Dr. Charles Zimpel, in 1864 
(Hülagü 2010). 
According to Hülagü (2010), the Emperor or the Sultan at that time was not able to undertake a series 
of valuable railroad construction projects. However, such projects were revived in the era of Sultan 
Abdulhamid II, the last great Ottoman Sultan. The Sultan approved the Hejaz Railway project, 
considering that the railway would help improve the economic and transportation as well as the defense 
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of the empire against foreign attacks and pave the way for international diplomacy. On May 2, 1900, he 
issued an imperial edict which sowed the seeds of a decades old dream. Consequently, the rail lines were 
laid from Damascus to Medina. The decision was that the project would be financed, built, and operated 
by the Ottoman Empire alone. The building of the Hijaz Railway presented a financial and engineering 
challenge. It required a budget of around $16 million dollars, and this was at the turn of the century when 
the dollar was worth a lot more than it is today. So, the Sultan appealed to the Muslims of the world for 
their emotional and financial support. Although the Hejaz Railway was short-lived, it left a remarkable 
legacy of the early twentieth century since it connected Istanbul, Damascus, Mecca, Medina, and the Red 
Sea.  
In 1908, the Hejaz Railway started to operate and the lines were laid from Damascus to Medina as it 
can be seen in map 1. The main track from Damascus to Medina was 1,302 kilometers long and contained 
around 80 stations at an average distance of 16.3 km apart, which allowed for efficient track monitoring, 
maintenance and rapid-response troop deployment for additional protection against anticipated Bedouin 
assaults.  
According to Eman (2004) on September 1, 1908, the railway officially opened and until the year 
1912 the Hejaz line was transporting 30,000 pilgrims a year. At that time, the pilgrimage had just become 
easier, business boomed, and by the year 1914 the annual load had reached 300,000 passengers. 
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Map 1: Hijaz Railway 
 
 
Unfortunately, the line was severely damaged during World War I (1914-1918) by Lawrance of 
Arabia and the Arab revolt. By 1920, the line’s part of the Arabian Peninsula was totally damaged and 
stopped operating. 
3- The Importance of the Saudi Railway Transportation Nowadays 
The railway system is known as the corner stone of the national economy in the developed world. 
Although railways projects are known to have high capital investments in the beginning, they have a 
relatively low operation cost. Moreover, the longer the transportation distance and the larger the 
transported material, the more cost-effective railway transportation becomes. This means that the 
feasibility and economic success of major industrial and agricultural projects depend heavily on the 
availability of a reliable, accountable and cost-effective transportation system (SRO 2011).  
Source: The Hejaz Railway, Nicholson J. 2005 
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In the domestic stage, the geographical expanse of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the obvious 
economic benefits of connecting the different regions of the Kingdom by railways and the discovery of 
large mineral ores in different parts of the Kingdom; such as Phosphate deposits in Hazm Al-Jalamid 
north of Sakakah and bauxite deposits in Al-Zubayrah; northeast of Buraydah, made the expansion of the 
current railways network inevitable (SAR 2011). Map 2, as can be seen below, shows the whole railway 
network in Saudi Arabia, both those in current operation and those planned.  
Map 2: The Saudi Future Railway Network Map 
 
 
 
Map 2 shows that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted a very ambitious program to develop and 
expand railways services in the Kingdom. Currently, this program includes four major projects; two of 
them were assigned to the Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) while the third and fourth were assigned to 
the Ministry of Finance represented by the Saudi Public Investment Fund and the Saudi Arabian Mining 
Company (Ma'aden) which introduced the new Saudi Railway Company (SAR).  
Source: The Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) 
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4- The Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) 
The Saudi Railway line from Dammam to Riyadh is considered as one of the oldest railway systems 
in the Middle East region. The idea of establishing a railway line in Saudi Arabia was first introduced in 
October 1947, when King Abdul Aziz gave his orders to construct a railway line that connects the 
Dammam Port to the Capital, Riyadh. The railway was introduced to facilitate the transport of goods 
of Saudi Aramco from ports located on the coast of the Persian Gulf to warehouses in Dhahran. 
Construction started in October 1947 and the line was officially opened by King Abdul Aziz on October, 
20, 1951.  It was initially run by Aramco, but subsequently transferred to the state and since 1968 has 
been operated as a public corporation called The Saudi Railways Organization (SRO). Several 
development projects have been completed since then, including an extension of the line to Riyadh, 
construction of several passenger terminals, and the opening of a dry port in Riyadh. In 1985, another line 
was constructed on 450 km to save 4 instead of 7 hours. Now SRO is a state-owned organization that 
provides passenger and freight services on two main lines totaling 1,018 km. SRO owns more than 2,277 
railroad cars for transporting passengers and solid and liquid goods. It has also established new stations in 
Riyadh, Dammam and Hofuf, in addition to updating the passengers and cargo cars, building maintenance 
centers, and constructing Riyadh's dry port. Figure 2, on page 27, shows the timeline of SRO and its 
institutional change from 1947-2005. 
 
1- SRO freight operation  
SRO freight’s operation which moves goods from Dammam port to Riyadh dry port is as vital as 
their passenger operation. In this study, we notice that the number of moved tons of freight was increasing 
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rapidly between 2003 and 2014. Chart 1 shows the increase of moved tons. Accordingly, May 6, 2003, is 
the date when the Saudi government decided to start the technical studies to establish the North-South 
railway; SAR. Also chart 1 shows that in 2006 up to 2008 SRO slowed down its capability of moving 
tons of freight, due to the fact that SAR received its operation license in May, 24, 2006. Therefore, by 
2006 the railway sector became a duopoly shared by SRO and SAR.  
Chart 1: Tons of Freight SRO 
 
 
Also, SRO added various numbers of new and efficient cars which help SRO move more goods 
between Riyadh and Dammam. The number of moved wagons can be seen in chart 2.   Chart 3 shows the 
number of freight trips between Riyadh and Dammam during 2001-2014. 
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Chart 2: Total Number of Moved Wagons between Riyadh and Dammam SRO 
 
 
Chart 3: Number of Freight Trips SRO 
 
 
2- SRO Passenger Operation 
      Understanding the importance of passenger railway as a transportation option and economic 
development tool could be the major concern of SRO in Saudi Arabia. People can travel by any other 
transportation means such as cars, airplanes and buses but the experience of traveling by train is a 
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different experience. Also, the safety issue of traveling by train can be another concern and may reduce 
the number of travelers. This can make traveling by train the last option; however, in chart 4 we could see 
that the number of passengers increased between 2001 and 2014 especially from 2003 to 2014.  Also, 
chart 5 shows the number of passenger trips for the same period, 2001-2014.   
SRO passenger train is considered as one of the slowest trains in the Middle East, first because of the 
safety issue and avoiding accidents and second because the train moves across an area which is 70% 
desert. This area is hit by sand storms throughout the year where sand covers the rail tracks causing most 
train accidents in Saudi Arabia. 
Chart 4: Number of Passengers SRO 
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Chart 5: Number of Passenger Trips SRO 
 
 
5- The Saudi Railway Company (SAR) 
Accordingly, the government adopted a very ambitious program to develop and expand railway 
services in the Kingdom. Currently, this program includes three major projects; two of them were 
assigned to SRO while the third was assigned to the Ministry of Finance represented by The Saudi Public 
Investment Fund (PIF) and the Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden).  PIF established the Saudi 
Railway Company (SAR) as a private company. 
SAR was established in 2006 as a new name in the domestic transport market seeking to satisfy 
market needs by providing the best advanced railway services encompassing transport of passengers, 
freight, minerals and transit services between the neighboring countries. SAR is one of the biggest 
infrastructure projects in Saudi Arabia that support the national industrial sector as well as provide a new, 
safe means to transport passengers among the Saudi cities. According to SAR CEO, SAR has freighted 
more than 1.7 million tons of phosphate during 2011-2012, replacing the need for a number of 69,000 
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trucks running on the road between the mines and the Madden factories. Chart 6 shows how many tons of 
freight were moved whereas chart 7 shows the number of moved wagons. 
Chart 6: Tons of Freight SAR 
 
 
  Chart 7: Number of Moved Wagons SAR 
 
 
The current freight and the future passenger railway will link a number of cities, neighboring areas 
and villages which will lead to their development socially, economically, industrially, agriculturally and 
commercially. In the future, this will help also to establish advanced industries in the north of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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According to the SAR project, which is known as the North-South Railway (NSR), and it is one of 
the largest railway projects in the world that is currently under construction. Upon completion of the SAR 
project, it will be approximately 2,750 KM long. The SAR Project consists of two main lines, one 
originating in Riyadh running northwest toward Al Haditha near the Jordanian border. This line will pass 
through Majma’a, Qassim, Hail and Al-Jawf. The second main line running from Al-Jalamid mine in the 
Northern province and then passing by Al-Jawf and Hail until a point referred to as "AlBaithah Junction" 
in Qassim province then going east to the processing and export facilities in Ras AlKhair in the Eastern 
province on the coast of the Arabian Gulf (SAR 2011) as outlined in map 3.  
Map 3: Operated and Under Construction Line of SAR 
 
 
6- The Institutional Change and the Expanding Project 
The Saudi Railway Authority, headed by the Ministery of Transport (MOT), monitors the operation 
of SRO and SAR. Based on the Government's objective to extend new lines to cover other regions in the 
Kingdom and to reach other neighboring countries due to the importance of rail transportation, MOT 
Source: The Saudi Railway Company (SAR) 
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conducted many studies about the expansion of the railway network. The Kingdom's Higher Economic 
Council issued its approval of executing the expansion, after inviting financial, technical and legal 
specialists to prepare the project's documents. It is open for the private sector and also for international 
investment. The institutional structure of the Saudi Railway sector as can be seen in figure 1 shows the 
government tendency to privatize this sector by investing and developing SRO and SAR. This structure 
clarifies the institutional roles that the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) as a regulator, the Authority of 
Railway as an infrastructure manager and supervisor and SRO and SAR as operators, play in the current 
railway sector environment.  
Figure 1: The Structure of the Railway Sector in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
 
 
- The Haramin High Speed Line 
Map 4 shows the Haramin high speed line which links Medina, Makkah and Jeddah, this line will 
serve the pilgrimage as well as people living in these cities. This line is expected to transport more than 
The Ministry of Transportation (MOT) 
The Saudi Railway 
Structure 
The Authority of Railway The Saudi Operators; SRO & SAR 
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15 million visitors and Saudi citizens. It will also reduce the number of buses and other private 
transportation vehicles.  
 
 Map 4: Haramin High Speed Railway 
  
 
This line will be the first high speed railway in the Middle East. A Spanish company called Renfe 
signed a contract with SRO to provide the Haramin high speed railway rolling stocks with a speed that 
will reach 300 km per hour.  
- The Land-bridge Line  
The land-bridge line aims to connect the Saudi ports in the Arabian Gulf with other ports in the Red 
Sea. This project was one of SRO projects. However, the government, after long discussions considering 
the rapid launch of SAR, decided to terminate the contract in 2013 with SRO and signed this project's 
Source: The Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) 
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contract with SAR. The following Map 5 shows the land-bridge line. The lines from Dammam to Riyadh 
are operated by SRO but the lines from Riyadh to Jeddah, as already mentioned, is under construction by 
SAR.  
Map 5: The Land-bridge Line 
 
 
- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Railway Line 
At the international stage, the idea of establishing a railway network to link the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) six countries, namely; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, 
Kingdom of Bahrain, and Kuwait, emerged in 2000. Experts believe that such network would increase the 
level of trade exchange between the countries of the region, alleviate traffic congestion and reduce 
pollution. It is expected that this network will be the core of the network project connecting all cities of 
the Middle East. Countries in the region have realized the need for an initiative to cover the region as a 
whole, prompting them in 1999 to adopt a development plan for an integrated transport system in Western 
Source: The Saudi Railway Company (SAR), Riyadh-Jeddah Line 
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Asia under the auspices of the United Nations - Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
(ESCWA). This initiative paved the way to studying the economic feasibility for a railway line linking the 
Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States.  
It is expected that the total length of the network will be about 2,000 km starting from the Iraq-
Kuwait borders up to Oman passing through Qatar, Saudi Arabia, in parallel to the coast of the Arabian 
Gulf as can be seen in map 6. Studies indicate an expected growth in figures of goods’ transport by train 
after the implementation of the Gulf railway network. It is expected that an estimated 31 million tons of 
goods will be transported by train in 2016 consisting of 17 million tons of heavy raw materials and 4.1 
million tons of goods imported by some of the GCC countries from abroad.  
The following table 1, which shows the level of transport imported by all modes of transportation in 
the years 2004-2006 (in million tons), compared with the expected to be only transferred by train in 2016. 
Table 1:  GCC Current Transportation and Expected by Train (in Million Tons): 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) 
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Map 6: GCC Railway 
 
 
 Figure 2 explains the trend of the railway institutional change and development. As mentioned 
above, SRO has changed from 1947 to 2005 and since then a new company joined the Saudi railway 
business which is SAR.    
Figure 2: Institution Timeline of the Railway in Saudi Arabia for SRO and SAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study, we aim to investigate the liability of renewal of the Saudi Railway Organization (SRO). 
The first section highlights the establishment of SRO and presents the problem statement including the 
Source: The Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) 
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research question. In the second section, we develop our conceptual model and the main propositions of 
this research. In the third section, we examine the research methodology and how we collect the research 
data. In the final section, we analyze the data and discuss the findings and conclusion of this paper.  In 
order to understand the process of organizational renewal in the Saudi Railway Organization (SRO), it is 
important to understand the establishment, in some detail, the history of the Saudi Railway Organizations 
(SRO) which was discussed in previous sections. 
7- Introduction to the Problem Statement and Research Question 
SRO went through different stages of change and development as can be seen in figure 1 on page 23 
and figure 2 on page 27. In 2005, new projects were proposed for SRO by the Saudi government. The 
initiation of new expanding projects resulted in SRO being unable to adapt to new environmental 
demands. From this result we can summarize two consequences.  First, the SRO failure to adapt to the 
new project indicates that SRO could be exhibiting structure inertia. Second, this failure in its 
performance could have impacted SRO's legitimacy. As a result the Saudi government established a new 
railway organization, the Saudi Railway Company (SAR) in 2006, to carry out the new project, but it did 
not close down SRO. Instead, SRO was given the opportunity to try again since it was determined that 
having two functioning railway organizations would be better than just one.   Part of the impact on SRO's 
legitimacy has been to stimulate an attempt by SRO to enhance its organizational capabilities, 
performance and learning.  
We examine the period from 2001 to 2014 and focus on SRO’s attempts at organizational renewal. 
One reason behind choosing this period of time is that the Saudi government initiated its new expansion 
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project from 2005. At the same time, the Saudi government has pushed a new private company into the 
market which is called Saudi Railway Company (SAR). The launch of SAR is an indication of the loss of 
SRO’s legitimacy. Hence, we considered this period of time to be a critical one in understanding SRO’s 
attempts at overcoming the liability of renewal. We will examine SRO in the period 2001-2005 as the 
pre-SAR institutional environment. We will then examine SRO from 2005-2014 as the period of strong 
environmental change, since this is the time when SAR was established, even though it began operations 
from 2011.    
On the one hand, we consider the period 2005–2014 of the new company SAR as a substantial 
institutional change in the Saudi Railway sector. Since SAR has three years of freight operation from 
2011-2014, we assume that SAR’s freight operation is one reason of the overcoming of the liability of 
renewal at SRO.  Figure 3 shows the development of the railway’s operators as well as the period of our 
study.  
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Figure 3: The Development of Railway’s Operators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, SAR as a new company may survive the period of liability of newness. We need 
to understand this concept since we believe it underpins the liability of renewal that SRO is undergoing.  
According to Aldrich and Fiol (1994) study, where they discussed the ability to survive the liability of 
newness and how to gain legitimacy for newly established organization they recognize a multi-level 
nested structure for legitimacy. In Table 2 we replicate the four levels of social context as proposed by 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) which founding entrepreneurs must work in in order to build trust, reliability, 
reputation and institutional legitimacy. 
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Table 2: Entrepreneurial Strategies to Promote New Industry Development (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) 
Type of legitimacy 
Level of Analysis Cognitive Sociopolitical 
Organizational/ 
trust  
Develop knowledge base via symbolic 
language and behavior.   
Develop trust in the new activity by 
maintaining internally consistent stories. 
Intraindustry/ 
reliability  
Develop knowledge base by 
encouraging convergence around 
dominant design.  
Develop perceptions of reliability by 
mobilizing to take collective action. 
Interindustry/ 
reputation  
Develop knowledge base by 
promoting activity through third party 
actor. 
Develop reputation of a new activity as a 
reality by negotiating and compromising 
with other industries. 
Institutional / 
legitimacy  
Develop knowledge base by creating 
linkages with established educational 
curricula. 
Develop legitimacy by organizing 
collective marketing and lobbying efforts.  
 
- Building trust at SAR can be seen by the rapid launch of their freight operation and how the CEO 
Dr. Romih Alromih selects employees based on their educational level as well as their experience. 
Also, sharing the achievement of SAR and celebrating it as they were one team following one 
leader. This team develops trust in the new activities of the freight operation. By transporting 
millions of tons of Phosphate and Bauxite, SAR has internally developed stories of achievement 
consistently.  
- Achieving reliability at SAR by its monopoly of moving Phosphate and Bauxite and how SAR is 
proud of being the first mover in this freight operation, where SAR’s team work day and night to 
move million tons of Phosphate and Bauxite from the mine to the factory.  
- SAR starts to gain reputation by its line that goes across different cities and villages. In these 
cities and villages, companies that aim to reduce their cost of transportation sign contracts with 
Source: Aldrich and Fiol, 1994. 
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SAR to move goods. SAR became the first mining line since the beginning of railways in Saudi 
Arabia. As we mentioned, SAR moves Phosphate and Bauxite for Ma’adin mining company.    
- Gaining legitimacy can be seen first in SAR attempts to establish relationships with educational 
institutions in Saudi Arabia aiming to increase the level of Railway knowledge. As the Saudi 
government recognizes SAR as an efficient company in terms of punctuation and efficiency of 
constructing the north-south line, the Riyadh-Jeddah line which is called the land-bridge was also 
assigned to SAR.  
In this study, we notice that we need to have a similar discussion of SRO’s attempts to re-establish its 
legitimacy as outlined in the previous page’s description of the influence of the liability of renewal on 
cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy by level of analysis as can be seen in table 3 (Methe’ and Alshehri, 
2015). 
Table 3: Renewable Strategies to Promote Established Industry Re-development. 
Type of legitimacy in terms of liability of renewal 
Level of Analysis Cognitive Sociopolitical 
Organizational/  
re-building trust  
Unlearning old routines and establish 
new routines. Re-image symbolic 
language and behavior    
Re-establish trust in the new routine by re-
forming the vision for organization.    
Intraindustry/ re-
building reliability  
Unlearning old routine and 
establishing new routine re-vise the 
dominant design. 
Undo damaged perceptions of reliability by 
swift corrective actions in line with the new 
vision 
Interindustry/ re-
building 
reputation  
Unlearning old routine and 
establishing new routine by 
reconnecting with third party actor. 
Undo damaged reputation by actions which 
reframe the network connections with other 
industries. 
Institutional / re-
building 
legitimacy  
Unlearning old routine and 
establishing new routine by recreating 
linkages with and developing new 
educational curricula.  
Re-establish legitimacy by reforming the 
criteria needed for status, through 
marketing and lobbying effort 
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- Rebuilding trust at SRO can be seen by importing efficient rolling stocks for both freight and 
passenger operation which can be seen as a reflection of the fact that old rolling stocks were the 
main cause of train accidents. SRO is considered to have old infrastructure, thus it started to build 
new bridges and maintain the rail tracks. SRO as a public owned organization has to face, 
announce and share all its achievement and failure with the Saudi media. It has an education 
center in Dammam headquarters operating to develop SRO employees only.  These changes since 
2001 can be seen as re-forming the vision for SRO however in reality it still cannot benefit from 
its achievements to rebuild trust because of the inertia of old routines.  
- Rebuilding reliability at SRO shows no change even with upgrading its rolling stock or 
maintaining tracks. Although SRO is about to celebrate 65
th
 years of operation, it is still not 
reliable in terms of its capability to move goods and passengers. Staff at SRO are considered to 
follow a governmental routine (working to get a salary even if the organization is not profitable, 
because the government pays the salary anyway) which has an impact on their teamwork and as a 
result affect their outcome. So, SRO has to unlearn the old routine and increase its ability to be 
self-dependent and then become a private organization.  
- Re-building reputation by signing a contract with a maintenance company that can take care of 
the rail tracks. This allows SRO to prevent any government blame if any accident happened by 
the dereliction of the maintenance company.   Also, SRO tried to rebuild reputation by offering 
discount tickets for students living between Dammam and Riyadh. According to SRO President, 
Engineer Mohamed Alsuwaiket, SRO sees the safety issue as its priority, so he requested all 
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trains’ drivers to slow the speed down at the area of frequent accidents which can help to decrease 
the number of accidents. We think that these actions are attempts to undo the damaged reputation 
and they are actions that reframe the network connections with other industries.    
- SRO loss of legitimacy is one of our main focuses in this study. Also, by not finishing the 
Haramin high speed project, SRO is facing further loss of its legitimacy of being the first railway 
organization to build a high speed system. Rebuilding or regaining legitimacy can occur by 
recreating linkages with, and developing new educational curricula, and by attempts to market to 
and lobby important stakeholders.  
8- Introduction of the Main Idea of This Study  
Organizational change remains an important field of research in management for many scholars. 
Many schools of thought have discussed the period of change that new or established organizations need 
in order to adapt to a new environment as a critical time in which some organizations may fail. Aldrich 
and Fiol (1994) discussed the birth of an organization and its ability to survive as a period of “liability of 
newness”. They argued that this period of time can be a critical one for a new organization to adapt to the 
new environment. This kind of struggling to survive during the liability of newness phase may increase 
the probability of gaining or losing organizational legitimacy. On the other hand, Freeman, Carroll and 
Hanna (1983) argued that organizational death can occur at any time or age. We contend that 
organizational death and loss is seen as resulting from organizational rigidities that may happen at any 
time or age and for an incumbent organization attempting to regain its performance after a loss, it enters a 
period of risk for losing organizational legitimacy, we term this period the liability of renewal.  
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 Structural inertia is an implicit aspect of this study which can be a cause as well as an obstacle of 
organizational change. According to Larsen and Lomi, page 275 (2002) “as inertia increases the 
likelihood of successful change becomes smaller, in turn prolonged period of stasis increase the pressure 
for change in the organization. As pressure for change increases, it is reasonable to expect that at least 
some new changes attempts will be made”. An organization seeks to change in order to gain sustained 
competitive advantage. In addition, an organization tends to change its tangible and intangible elements in 
order to be successful. Therefore, an organization must have processes in place for continued learning and 
adaptation which can be called the organizational renewal process. What affects or stimulates this renewal 
process and how it operates within an organization is an important aspect that is still not well understood.  
Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett, (1993) argued that whenever an organization initiates a major change 
it resets its organizational clock. We contend that resetting an organizational clock is equal to changing 
organizational capabilities that lead to attempts at regaining legitimacy through improving performance, 
which leads to a hazard state
2
, which we call the liability of renewal. The liability of renewal, in our case, 
can be defined as whenever an old established organization tries to minimize errors to re-gain legitimacy 
throughout a process of organizational learning from changes in capabilities which aim to improve its 
performance.  In our model we show how an organization can put under consideration the advantages and 
disadvantages of a long period of operation in terms of its attempts at overcoming the liability of renewal. 
The model considers changes in organizational capability as changes in organizational learning. And if 
the model does not record changes it will directly show that the organization is experiencing inertia.  
                                                             
2
 By hazard state we mean a situation in which the probability of the organization failing has increased. 
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We develop a model of organizational renewal utilizing researches from various management schools 
of thought, such as Institutional Economics, Population Ecology, and Organizational Learning. Our 
model relates how changes in legitimacy and performance affect pressure for change on an organization. 
Further, our model relates how the organizational renewal process reflects on the balance between the 
dynamic aspect of organizational learning as demonstrated by changes in capabilities and the stabilizing 
aspects of organizational inertia.  
In this study we are examining two organizations within the Saudi Arabian railway sector. We 
analyze the Saudi Railway Organization (SRO) in terms of its freight and passenger operation from 2001-
2014 and also the freight operation at the Saudi Railway Company SAR from 2011-2014. We also expect 
that the new entrant SAR creates an environmental (institutional) turbulence or change that has an impact 
on the existing organization SRO. So, we examine SRO before and after SAR’s entrance into the Saudi 
Railway sector. We found support for our model in that most of our results were in the hypothesized 
direction. We found that learning from changes in organizational capability has a positive effect on 
performance. And that legitimacy has a positive effect on performance. We also found that performance 
and legitimacy have a negative relationship with pressure for change. Finally, we found that 
environmental (institutional) turbulence or change has an impact on the already established organization.     
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Chapter 2 
1- Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
- Introduction 
     In this section, we examine the previous research literatures that are relevant to our study. We first 
begin by examining research literatures which focus on railway and railway development. We then turn 
our attention to institutional economics and organizational change. We then look into the elements of 
population ecology research which are relevant to organizational change. At the end of this section and 
after examining these research literatures we turn our attention to how we developed our conceptual 
model and propositions.       
1.1. Railway System and Organizational Change, Empirical Studies on Railways Systems 
In order to put SRO’s and SAR’s change attempts in context, we need to examine how railway 
organizations have changed overtime. Rietveld and Stough (2006) examined institutional and regulatory 
aspect of sustainable transport from across national perspective. They found that the role that institutions 
play in sustainable development is not clear but they agreed that institution play an important role in the 
economic success of rail organizations.  Mulder, Lijesen and Driessen (2005), studied the assessment of 
cost and benefit of the structural change in the Dutch railway system in the late 1990s.  Accordingly, their 
study analyzed the flexibility of economies of scope in the Dutch railways system and how institutional 
changes have an effect on the efficiency of both passenger and freight. They found that institutional 
change did not improve the efficiency of the passenger operators. However freight operations have 
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improved through this institutional change (Mulder, Lijesen and Driessen 2005). Nevertheless, our study 
focuses mainly on institutional change as environmental turbulence and how that has an effect on the 
changes of organizational capability. We assume that changes may and may not improve railway 
performance. We also assume that the level of organizational adaptation to the new environment can be 
decided based on current capabilities and the pressure for change which is influenced by the legitimacy of 
the organization as well as by the organization’s performance.    
Organizational change in the railway system is connected with the restructuring of the institutional 
environment in terms of nationalization and privatization. In studying privatization, Misutani and 
Uranishi (2003) looked into the main factors that increase the total factor productivity (TFP) of the 
privatization of the Japanese railway. They found that TFP was growing at 0.59% annually. Another 
study by Mitsutani and Nakamura (2004) aimed to explain the Japanese approach to railway reform and 
lessons learned from the privatization process. They found that the Japanese approach to privatization 
improved productivity, cut operating deficits, decreased fares, and provided better services. In addition, 
Obermauer (2002) argued that fully privatized organizations were more efficient in the domestic and the 
international market. A study by Lodge (2003) discussed the regulatory change in the railways of Britain 
and Germany. Lodge (2003) argued that organizational learning and transfer processes could be better 
understood through an institutional perspective in each country. Thus the institutional environment is an 
important consideration. Also from these studies we believe that state-owned organizations have 
constraints on their productivity and such constraints impose structural inertia. This appears to be the 
situation currently confronted by SRO. But in the case of SAR as a private company it has less constraints 
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on its productivity. Oum and Yu (1994) discussed the productive efficiency of the rail way sector of 19 
countries. They aimed to identify the effects on efficiency of public subsidy and the level of managerial 
independency. They found that railway systems with less dependence are significantly more efficient on 
public subsidies than others with high dependence. They also found that railways with high level of 
managerial independency from regulatory authority tend to achieve higher efficiency (Oum and Yu 1994).   
Lan and Lin (2006) measured the performance of railways in the EU regions that produce passenger 
and freight services by distinguishing technical inefficiency from service ineffectiveness. They found that 
railways which are distinguished by technical inefficiency and service ineffectiveness are negatively 
influenced by gross national income per capita, percentage of electrified lines, and line density. 
Given the sensitivity of railway system to environmental change as well as the importance of 
transportation in the movement of goods and people, especially in developing countries, there is a need 
for studies which examine institutional attempts to renew their capabilities within the context of being 
state-owned as well as private within one sector and to understand the liabilities generated in this process. 
Although most of the empirical studies were focusing on aspects of changes at the railway sector level 
that may improve productivity or efficiency, in our study we focus on the changes in organizational 
capabilities in terms of operation which directly affect organizational performance. These changes result 
from institutional or environmental changes and how organizations react towards these changes by 
focusing on the level of performance. We explore these issues in details in the section below.   
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1.2. Institutional Economics and the Organizational Change 
Institutional economics examines the role that institutions play in shaping economic behaviors. And 
that change in institutions can have an impact on organizations. Since organizations exist in an 
institutional setting, it is important to understand how institutions change and how these changes 
influence organizational change especially in terms of organizational legitimacy. Our study argues that 
the institutional environment has a strong influence on the legitimacy of an organization. 
North (1991) has defined institutions as rules for governing the exchanges that occurs in society.  
Human beings have devised constraints on the institutional transformation process in order to regulate it, 
including formal and informal rules (North, 1991). An important notion of the study of Kingston and 
Caballero (2009) was that some theories indicated the importance of deliberate action in the birth of 
institutions usually through some political process, while other theories saw institutions as emerging 
through a more bottom up emergent evolutionary process. Holm’s (1995) study has argued that 
understanding institutional change has problems which can be solved if institutions are seen as a nested 
system. He argued that the nested system is an interconnected, multilevel system in which each action-
level is a framework for action and a product of action. His perspective on the nested system relies more 
on endogenous processes than exogenous forces in explaining institutional change (Holm, 1995). 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) posited that the internal dynamic of an organization will strongly 
influence the ability to respond to pressure for change that originate from institutional sources. We 
contend that such institutional transformation processes have had an influence on organizational 
legitimacy which increases the likelihood of environmental pressure for change. We propose a model, 
which is a nested model that incorporates internal change processes nested within processes that affect 
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legitimacy and pressure for change. Organizations can choose to adapt to these pressure for change or not. 
Each alternative, to adapt or not, has risks associated with it.  
Zucker (1987) defined the theoretical approach of institution to two concepts, one is the environment 
as institution and the other is the organization as institution. In this study, we considered the environment 
as an institution that affects organizational change.  We assume that the level of organizational adaptation 
to the new environment can be decided based on current capabilities and the pressure for change which is 
influenced by the legitimacy as well as by the organization’s performance. Therefore, we assert that such 
action and subsequent reaction increase the likelihood of an organization surviving the period of liability 
of renewal. We describe the period of liability of renewal in more detail in the late section.    
   Organizational change theory suggests that environmental changes that cause organizational 
decline in performance will lead to pressure for change.  We expect that decreases in organizational 
legitimacy will also influence performance and that both lower performance and loss of legitimacy will 
lead to pressure for change on the organization.  We also expect that whenever the level of pressure for 
change increases, that may cause changes in organizational capabilities which lead to an improvement in 
performance. These relationships are summarized in this portion of our model in figure 4. 
Figure 4: The Relationship between Legitimacy, Performance, Pressure for Change and 
Organizational Capabilities 
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Pressure for change  
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1.3. Population Ecology and Organizational Change: 
Population Ecology theory contends that when an organization attempts to adapt to a new 
environment, usually it fails and ceases to exist. In essence population ecology argues that the 
environment selects for or against an organization. Organizations have a difficult time adapting to 
environmental changes. Structural inertia is an important aspect of this theory which can be seen as an 
obstacle to organizational change. Hannan and Freeman (1984) indicated that structural inertia influences 
most features of an organization’s structure. In their study, they indicated two features are important 
understanding the influence of inertia on organizational structure: one is the organization’s core (goals, 
forms of authority, core technology and marketing strategy) and the second is organization’s peripheral 
that is established to protect an organization’s core from uncertainty in the environment. They also 
predicted that core feature change will increase the probability of organizational failure and thus 
increasing the likelihood of an organization ceasing to exist (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). They noted 
that formal organizations have two important advantages over other collective actors; that is, their ability 
to perform reliably (in terms of capabilities) and to account rationally for their action (in terms of 
legitimacy).  Both organizational reliability and accountability requires organizational structures that are 
reproducible or stable over time (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). Alkaya and 
Herpaktan (2003) discussed the phase, barriers and variables that affect organization change. They found 
that if the aim is to have a successful change, the culture of an organization should be taken into account. 
Lunenburg (2010) concluded that internal and external forces can create the need for change in an 
organization and that would reduce resistance forces to change. Sastry (1997) also argued that internal 
factors influence organizational change such as routine for monitoring organization-environment fit and 
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trail period following a reorientation. Haveman (1992) proposed that organizational change can be 
beneficial if it builds on established routines and competences, thus we argue decreasing the liability of 
renewal. On the other hand, Gilbert (2005) discussed the distinction between resource rigidity and routine 
rigidity regarding effects of threat perception on inertia.  He found that resource rigidity can be overcome 
but in doing this can simultaneously amplify routine rigidity. 
 We contend that during the time period of organizational change that is, the period of liability of 
renewal, changes in organizational capabilities, as seen in changes in resources, influence both the 
learning process which attempt to increase performance but can also be exhibited as lags as routines 
attempt to catch up with the new environmental demands. Thus the capability may remain inert and 
generate lags in adaptation and negatively affects changes in organizational capabilities.  
   In the discussion of Population Ecology, we saw how an organization may fail to adapt to new 
environmental turbulence or changes. The degree of failure matters. With catastrophic failure an 
organization ceases to exist, but with non- catastrophic failure an organization has an opportunity to 
renew itself. We assert that non- catastrophic failure to adapt to the new environment causes pressure for 
change to learn from failure. We expect that when pressure for change becomes high, organizations seek 
for new knowledge in order to add new capability, whereas when pressure for change becomes low an 
organization remains inert. While failure in the population ecology view leads to the demise of the 
organization, we adopt a dynamic capabilities view as put forward by Teece, Pisaon and Shuen (1997). 
The dynamic capability concept suggests that failures that are less than catastrophic leads to lower 
performance and that in turn leads to adaptation through exploratory capability building activities.  
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Organizational capabilities are considered a core feature if they provide strategic differentiation for 
the organization (Barton, 1992). Case studies on firm capabilities and adaptation have primarily served to 
greatly explicate sources and causes of structural inertia and why firms are not able to adapt. Barton, 
(1992) argues for example, that "core capabilities can become core rigidities that can lead to 
organizational failure". As we noted we see this duality in Larsen and Lomi (2002), emphasized when 
they suggest that the ‘‘moving parts’’ of an idealized organizational system as representing the dynamic 
duality between organizational inertia and the evolution of capabilities.  
In terms of dynamic capability, Ambrosini, Bowman, & Collier, (2009) suggested three levels of 
dynamic capabilities. According to their study, “these levels are related to managers’ perceptions of 
environmental dynamism. The first level is “incremental dynamic capabilities” which are concerned with 
the continuous improvement of the firm’s resource base. The second level is “renewing dynamic 
capabilities” which are refreshing, adapting and augmenting the resource base. These two levels are 
usually represented as dynamic capabilities. The third level is “regenerative dynamic capabilities” which 
have an impact on firm current set of dynamic capabilities”. Capabilities have an effect on organizational 
performance. A study by Protogerou, Caloghirou and Lioukas (2008) investigated the direct and indirect 
relationships between dynamic capabilities and firm performance. They found that dynamic capabilities 
have a positive impact on firm performance during environmental change. 
We contend that attempts at change even with the attendant organizational liability of renewal offer a 
survival chance for organization. The organization must renew its capabilities as seen in increased use of 
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resources to adapt to the new environment and balance these with inertial forces in the organization as 
routines to catch up. 
1.4. Organizational Learning and Organizational Change under the Pressure for Change 
Organizational change always requires organizational learning which is important to increase 
organizational capabilities. Further, learning is not only differentiated by goal; that is, exploratory or 
exploitative but it is also differentiated by means; that is, direct, indirect and vicarious (Barnett and 
Hansen, 1998; Terlaak and Gong, 2008; Mitsuhashi, 2011; Greve, 2005; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
March 1991). In this study, we are trying to examine how organizational learning as an implicit process is 
inherent in the liability of renewal for established organization and in the liability of newness for new 
organization. Hernes and Irgens (2012) discussed organizational learning under continuity in a way that 
they thought that learning from past cases can be helpful in the present as well as an exploration of the 
future. Thus providing an intermediate ground between organizational change being successful and 
organizational change leading to catastrophic failure. Desai (2010), examined the moderating role of 
knowledge gained through an organization’s operating experience as a way that an organization can learn 
from failure. Another study focused on learning from failure and indicated that this kind of learning is 
essential to adaptation. They argued that such learning complements learning from success, (Baum and 
Dahlin, 2007). 
In addition to learning from failure, an organization can learn through other actions. A combination 
of exploitation and exploration learning which is called organizational capability-based learning can be 
seen in the study of Lejeune (2009). He argued that an integrative capability-based learning framework 
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help to understand organizational learning. Accordingly, organizational capabilities can be understood as 
one of the major sources of generating and developing a sustainable competitive advantage. Also 
organizational capabilities result from developments over time (Lejeune 2009). His framework aims to 
focus more on articulate learning dimensions such as (exploration and exploitation, cognition and action, 
context and process, single-loop and double-loop) as well as capabilities’ components (resources, 
activities, outcomes) as can be seen in figure 5 (Lejeune 2009).   
Figure 5: A Capability-based Learning Integrative Framework 
 
 
The argument by Hernes and Irgens (2012) which show that learning under continuity is equally 
important and requires more investment of effort, mindfulness and preparedness for change, even if there 
is no expected change. In Lejeune (2009) framework, and regarding our study, we expect that resources 
and capabilities can be the process of learning from changes in organizational capability either through 
Source: Lejeune C., 2009 
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exploration or exploitation and that activities and outcome can be the indications of performance. 
Although our study does not measure organization learning directly, we conclude that organizational 
capability-based learning is important as learning directly. 
On the one hand, we assert that learning from changes in organizational capabilities have a positive 
effect on the performance. On the other hand the lag of changes in organizational capabilities can show a 
level of inertia. We assume that understanding changes in capabilities overtime as a learning process can 
help to improve and develop organizational performance. And that is the main focus of our study, which 
is how the organizational renewal process reflects on the balance between the dynamic aspect of 
organizational learning as demonstrated by changes in capabilities and the stabilizing aspects of 
organizational inertia. We summarized these aspects of our model in figure 6.  
Figure 6: The Relationship between Inertia, Learning from Changes in Organizational Capabilities 
and Performance 
 
 
   
2- Conceptual Model and Propositions 
We have examined several research literatures that are important in building our conceptual model. 
From these research literatures, we have identified the relevant variables, and general relationships among 
Learning from changes in 
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Inertia  
Performance  
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the variables. We turn our attention to how these variables and their relationship are expressed in our 
model.   
For the first proposition, we infer that structural inertia may decrease organizational capabilities. 
Hence, whenever an organization has high levels of structural inertia it will have a negative influence on 
changes in its organizational capabilities. From this, we also infer that changes in organizational 
capability reflect the dynamic influence of learning. This leads us to the first proposition:     
Proposition 1: Inertia has a negative relationship with changes in organizational 
capabilities. 
 
We argued that changes in organizational capabilities can be regarded as changes in 
organizational learning. We are assuming that the dynamic aspects of learning will generate changes in 
organizational capabilities and these will result in improvement in how organizations perform. Singh, 
Chan and McKeen (2006), built on the theory of knowledge management capability to indicate how an 
organization can improve performance. They found that organizations should pay attention to investing 
more in its knowledge processes to improve its performance. We assume that changes in organizational 
capabilities are a result of these knowledge processes and will lead to high performance. This leads to our 
second proposition: 
Proposition 2: change in organizational capabilities has a positive relationship with changes 
in performance.  
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Legitimacy also can affect performance especially if certain organizational practices become 
normative, in that case legitimacy gains can become more important than performance improvements 
(Guo, 2012). Further the relationship between performance and legitimacy is affected by the type of 
environmental contingency or crisis such as the one suffered by SRO in 2005. In a study on crisis, 
Breitsohl (2009), found that “crises are indeed characterized by a loss in legitimacy, the specific 
dimensions depending on the type of crisis” (Breitsohl, 2009).  
We assert that institutional change can have an impact on the legitimacy of an organization and that 
leads to a decrease in performance and vice versa. Here we assume that organizational legitimacy can be 
impactful on performance.  This leads us to our third proposition: 
Proposition 3:  Legitimacy has a positive relationship with changes in performance. 
    
Following the notion of “for each action there is an equal and opposite reaction”, we believe that 
decreasing an organization’s performance which causes loss of organizational legitimacy will lead to an 
increase in pressure for change. Environmental change for a state-owned company is reflected in changes 
in legitimacy as expressed by its major stakeholders, the government. The loss in legitimacy from an 
organization’s stakeholders increases the likelihood of pressure for change. We assume that an 
organization decreased performance and losses in legitimacy leads to pressure for change. This leads us to 
our fourth and fifth proposition: 
Proposition 4:  changes in performance have a negative relationship with changes in pressure for 
change.  
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Proposition 5: changes in legitimacy have a negative relationship with changes in pressure for 
change.  
    
A key element which links the liability of newness with the liability of renewal is the extent to which 
organizations can learn or more precisely how established organizations can re-learn. Here, one aspect of 
the links between the liability of newness and the liability of renewal is that an old organization seeks to 
learn from failure. As we assume, in propositions 4 and 5, that loss of legitimacy and decrease of 
performance lead to pressure for change, we also assume that pressure for change has a positive impact 
on changes in organization capability. This leads us to sixth proposition:   
Proposition 6: Pressure for change has a positive relationship with Organizational learning. 
 
We have examined several research literatures that are important in building our conceptual model. 
We have identified the relevant variables that followed from each of the research literatures in terms of 
the relationships among the variables.  
  The components of our model shown in figures 4 and 6 and the propositions offered above are 
shown in our complete model in figure 7.  Our conceptual model shows that the organizational 
capabilities can be a source of errors in performance as well as source of legitimacies towards 
performance.  
         Our conceptual model also shows the process of how organizations whether in a state of renewal or 
newness are expected to improve the performance by enhancing organizational capabilities. Further, our 
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model emphasizes the learning process by changes in organizational capabilities as a way to increase both 
organizations to perform well and re/gain legitimacy. 
Figure 7: The Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance Zt  
Legitimacy Ut 
Org. learning: the changes in organizational 
capabilities over time (ΔYt= Yt - Yt-1)   
  
Inertia:  the coefficient of 
α2 which is drag coated by 
pervious  perceived 
organizational capabilities 
Yt-1.    
Pressure for change Xt 
H4 
H6 
H1 
H2 ΔUt ΔZt 
H3 
H5 
52 
 
Chapter 3 
1- Methodology and Analysis Development 
- Introduction: 
Here we decide the equations and variables we use in our study.  First we will explain our variables 
and then we turn our attention to our equations. In this study, we examine our variables for both 
organizations SRO and SAR separately by using the difference equation regression. We also expect that 
the new entrant SAR creates an environmental (institutional) turbulence or change that has an impact on 
the existing organization SRO. So we examine SRO before and after SAR’s entrance into the Saudi 
Railway sector. Variables in Equation 
In this study we choose relevant variables as can be seen in the Table 4. We explain the relationships 
among the variables and our measures and the reason for choosing these measures. We discuss these as 
follows: 
   First: Organizational capabilities denoted as Y. We are examining core capabilities of the 
organization. These core capabilities as represented by the Y variable are measured in terms of number of 
wagons for freight, number of freight and passenger trips, total number of freight cars, number of 
passenger cars and staff. This is in keeping with the study of Gilbert (2005).   We should note that in this 
study the number of passenger cars remains the same over the time series and then the number jumps 
from 75 cars to 115 cars in 2012. This may have an impact on our results.  
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Second: Performance denoted as Z. This variable is measured by the number of passengers, number 
of containers, Tons of freight, freight revenue and passenger revenue. We decided these measures based 
on railway’s industry common performance measures during the suggested period of time.  
Third: Pressure for change denoted as X. This variable is measured by percent of yearly achieved 
goals, passenger expenses, Freight expenses, ratio of freight train accidents and ratio of passenger train 
accidents. 
Fourth: Legitimacy denoted as U. This variable is measured by the budget paid by the Saudi 
government. In measuring all the above variables, we denoted time series as (t), and the time lags as (t-1). 
2- Difference Equation Model  
It was suggested that in order to test our model and propositions, this study applies a differences 
equation approach. We test these propositions using a time series from 2001-2014 for SRO and 2011-
2014 for SAR to understand the relationships among organizational inertia, organizational capability, 
legitimacy, performance and pressure for change. We tend to examine SRO per and post SAR entry. The 
model is summarized by equations 1 through 3, to which we apply regression analysis.  
Equation 1:  ΔYt= α0+ α1 Xt+ α2 Yt-1 +εt.  
    Where:    α2 Yt-1= Organizational capability lagged one year as our indicator of inertia.  
ΔYt = Yt - Yt-1 = Changes in organizational capability as indicator of organizational 
learning. 
 Xt =Pressure for change. 
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   Our first equation aims to test the relationship on learning for propositions 1 and 6.  In this equation 
we denote changes in organizational capabilities as learning as ΔY as the dependent variable and lags in 
organizational capability as organizational inertia as the coefficient α2 of Yt-1 and the pressure for change 
Xt  as the independent variables as can be seen in figure 8.  This equation was recommended by Preece 
(1984) in his paper, which called for the use of mathematical modeling for the understanding of learning.  
From this equation we expect to show the organizational inertia level by using the regression coefficient 
of the lagged capability variables.  A negative coefficient indicates negative learning, that is, inertia in the 
organization in that it has a damping effects on the organizational capabilities. Organizational learning is 
indicated in our model by changes in organizational capabilities, ΔYt.  
 
Figure 8: The Relationships Measured by Equation 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 2:  ΔZt= b0+ b1 ΔYt + b2 Ut +εt. 
Where:       ΔZt = Zt – Zt-1 = Changes in organization performance. 
        Ut = Legitimacy. 
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The second equation measures the relationship between changes in organization performance ΔZt 
with changes in learning Δ Yt and legitimacy Ut. This equation aims to test propositions 2 and 3 as can be 
seen in figure 9. 
Figure 9: The Relationships Measured by Equation 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 3:   ΔXt = c0+ c1 ΔZt + c2 ΔUt +εt. 
   Where:      ΔXt =Xt – Xt-1 = Changes in pressure for change. 
      ΔUt = Ut - Ut-1 = Changes in legitimacy. 
    
The third equation measures the relationship between the changes in pressure for change ΔXt by 
measuring changes in organization performance ΔZt and changes in legitimacy ΔUt. This equation tests 
propositions 4 and 5 as can be seen in figure 10. 
Figure 10: The Relationships Measured by Equation 3 
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  In all equations we test our propositions through regression analysis for each dependent variable 
with only two independent variables. In the equations we test each equation separately and not 
simultaneously. This was because the numbers of variables are large, but observations per variable are 
kind of small (13 years) for SRO and (3 years) for SAR. If we put all relevant variables in a single 
equation, all the parameters could not be measured simultaneously.  Thus, we chose to test each 
dependent variable against the two independent variables separately.   For example, in order to evaluate 
the first equation, we run regression analysis for each organizational capability measure separately against 
lags of pressure for change and organizational capability measures.   
   To examine SRO and since it is state owned organization, we got a permission from the previous 
Saudi Minister of Transport Gebara Bin Eid to collect all the data needed in this paper. So we collected 
all the data from SRO directly. Also to examine SAR we got permission from the CEO Dr. Romih 
Alromih. And these data collection activities are detailed in appendices 1- 7. 
3- The Time Variation for SRO / Pre-SAR and Post-SAR Entry 
 We think that the time variation plays a big role in which we measure SRO passenger and freight 
operation between 2001-2005 as pre-SAR entry and 2006-2014. These will allow us to show the 
consequences of the environmental changes in the Saudi railway sector. 
By emphasizing the time variation, we want to make sure, how the organizational renewal process 
reflects on the balance between the dynamic aspect of organizational learning as demonstrated by changes 
in capabilities and the stabilizing aspects of organizational inertia, before and after SAR entry. For this 
section of the result we use the same equations. 
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 Table 4: The Relationships among Variables and our Measures 
Variable codes Variable names Conceptual definition of 
variables 
Operationalization (measurement 
definition) of variables 
Why these measures are used for 
each variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
 
N.W.F 
Yearly No. of 
wagons of freight   
at SRO and SAR 
Organizational capability 
related to operating freight.  
No. of freight wagons per single trip 
*No. of total freight trips per year  
This measure is related to the core 
capability of the amount of transported 
freight. 
 
N.F.T 
Yearly No. of 
freight trips at SRO 
and SAR 
Organizational capability 
related to operating freight.  
No. of total trips per year/ No. of 
freight wagons per single train 
This measure is related to the core 
capability of transported No. of wagons.  
N.P.T Yearly No. of 
Passenger trips  
Organizational capability 
related to operating 
passenger  
Reserved No of passenger trips   This measure is related to the core 
capability. 
 
N.F.C 
Total No. of freight 
cars in each year at 
SRO and SAR 
Organizational capability 
related to add cars to the 
freight operation. 
Added No. of freight cars in each 
year  
Adding more cars increases the core 
capability of fright operation.  
 
N.PC 
No. of passenger 
cars in each year 
Organizational capability 
related to add cars to the 
passenger operation. 
Added No. of passenger cars in each 
year  
Adding more cars increases the core 
capability of passenger operation.  
 
S 
Staff  at SRO and 
SAR 
Organizational capability 
related to add No. of staff to 
both freight and passenger 
operation. 
Added No. of staff in each year. Adding more staff increases core 
organizational capability to handle 
freight and passenger operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Z 
P Passenger Organization performance 
related to passenger 
operation. 
Registered No. of passengers in 
each year. 
In the railway system the No. of 
passengers is related to passenger 
operation performance.  
C  Container  Organization performance 
related to freight operation. 
Registered No. of containers in each 
year. 
In the railway system the No. of 
containers and tons of freight are related 
to freight operation performance. 
T.F  Tons of freight at 
SRO and SAR 
Organization performance 
related to freight operation. 
Registered tons of freight in each 
year. 
P.R   Revenue of 
passenger operation  
Organization performance 
related to passenger 
operation. 
Registered passenger revenue for 
operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO. 
Both freight and passenger operations’ 
revenues are related to the performance 
outcome. We use these measures to 
evaluate organization performance. 
F.R   Revenue of Freight 
operation  at SRO 
and SAR 
Organization performance 
related to freight operation. 
Registered freight revenue for 
operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
% Ach 
G      
Percentage of 
achieved goal each 
year at SRO and 
SAR 
Pressure for change   % of achieved goal from the 
financial statement of SRO in each 
year.   
We find this measure as pressure for 
change, we think that if the organization 
couldn’t achieve its goals in a year it 
will be forced to improve to achieve it 
in other year.    
F.EX Expenses of freight 
operation at SRO 
and SAR 
Pressure for change   Registered freight expenses for 
operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO 
Since SRO is a state-owned company, 
both expenses paid by the government 
can be related to pressure for change. 
For SAR which is a private investment 
shared between government and other 
investors   
P.EX Expenses of 
passenger operation  
Pressure for change   Registered passenger expenses for 
operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO. 
R. F.Ac Ratio of freight 
accidents at SRO 
and SAR 
Pressure for change   No. of total freight trips per year/% 
of total accident per year 
This is a measure of pressure for change 
since any increase in accidents will 
increase pressure to improve. 
R. P.Ac Ratio of passenger 
accidents  
Pressure for change   No. of total passenger trips per 
year/% of total accident per year 
 
U 
Bud Budget paid by 
the government and 
investors for each 
company SRO & 
SAR 
Legitimacy  The amount of money paid by the 
government year from the yearly  
financial statement of SRO 
Since SRO is a state-owned company its 
major stakeholders is the government. 
Budget is a payment, which can be 
regarded as a source of legitimacy,  
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Chapter 4 
1- Results 
- Introduction  
       In this section, we first examine the propositions for SAR from 2011-2014 using the equations 
described earlier and then we do the same examination with the same equations for SRO from 2001-2014. 
In both examinations we will examine the propositions using the differences variable regression. For the 
last part of the result we use the same equations to measure SRO activities during the pre-SAR entry from 
2001-2005 and post-SAR entry from 2006-2014. At the end of this chapter we turn our attention to our 
discussion of this study.  
Table 5 shows the result for proposition 1 and 6 for SAR which includes the relationship between 
changes in organizational capabilities as an indicator of learning with ΔY as the dependent variable and 
the lag of organizational capability as α2 the coefficient of Yt-1 and the pressure for change Xt as the 
independent variables. As we noted in our model α2 the coefficient of Yt-1 is an indicator for 
organizational inertia. In this table, the results of the regression analysis are displayed. The study did not 
find a significant (<0.1or <0.5) relationship but positive relationships were found between changes in 
learning and pressure for change which supports proposition 6. Although we do not have significant result 
the positive coefficients are as expected and thus indicate that pressure for change can have a positive 
effect on organizational learning. 
Looking at Table 5 in more detail, we found that the measure for pressure for change has a positive 
effect on the change in organizational capability. But we also found a negative but not significant 
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relationship between the percentage of achieved goals as a measure of pressure for change with the 
number of freight cars and staff as an indicator of changes in organizational capabilities. And we also 
found a negative relationship between freight expenses as a measure for pressure for change with the 
number of wagon for freight. Finally, we found that the ratio of freight accidents as indicator of pressure 
for change has a negative effect on the number of freight cars. All these negative results do not support 
proposition 6.  Overall, however the other results are in the hypothesized direction and thus we found that 
pressure for change increases the likelihood to learn as indicated by changes in capability.  
   A2 the coefficient of the Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1 is our measure of organizational 
inertia and shows some negative as well as positive relationships with learning from changes in 
capabilities ΔY.  This is not in the expected direction and shows support for proposition 1, which states 
that inertia, has a negative effect on organizational learning. We found an equal number of negative and 
positive coefficients. Thus we found some organizational inertia, that overall, we found inertia has an 
indeterminate effect on organizational learning which does not support proposition 1. We discuss some 
possible explanations for these results in our discussion section.    
Table 5: The Saudi Railway Company SAR, the Result of Equation 1 
Xt, Yt-1 
 + - + - + - 
ΔYt % Achi Yt-1 F.Ex Yt-1 R.F.Acc Yt-1 
N.W.F .368  .823 -.841 1.701 .360 .854 
N.F.T .641 -.564 2.265 -2.989 .666 -.505 
N.F.C -1.202 .333 1.120  -1.210 -1.117 .206 
S -.573 1.086 1.023 -.027 1.036 -.555 
           ** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
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Table 6, shows the result for proposition 1 and 6 for SRO which includes the relationship between 
changes in organizational capabilities as an indicator of learning using ΔYt as the dependent variable 
regressed on the lag of organizational capability as α2 the coefficient of Yt-1   and the pressure for change 
Xt as the independent variables.  
In table 6, the results of the regression analysis are displayed. The study found a significant (<0.1or 
<0.5) and positive relationship between changes in learning and pressure for change which supports 
proposition 6. This indicates that pressure for change has a positive effect on organizational learning.   
Table 6: The Saudi Railway Organization SRO, the Result of Equation 1 
Xt, Yt-1 
 + - + - + - + - + - 
ΔYt %Achi  Yt-1 F.Ex Yt-1 P. Ex Yt-1 R.F.acc Yt-1 R.P.acc Yt-1 
N.W.F .071 -.377 .300 -.367 .018 -.329 ..443 -.458 .397 -.352 
N.F.T -.679** -.256 .139 -.213 .647** -.503* -.594 -.586 .127 -.288 
N.P.T -.045 -.194 -.044 -.203 .352 -.248 .180 -.263 .309 -.311 
N.F.C .517* -.138 -.610 -.565 -.339 -.200 -304 -.180 -.455 -.154 
N.P.C .026 -.150 -.428 -.280 .199 -.199 -.228 -.031 -.487 .103 
S .358 -.498 -.372 -.638 -.346 -.601 -.061 -.400 .048 -.391 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
By looking at Table 6 in more detail, we found that the measure for pressure for change as indicated 
by percentage of achieved goals has a positive and significant effect on the change in organizational 
capability as measured by the change in the numbers of freight cars.  We also found that the passenger 
expenses as a measure of pressure for change positively and significantly affects the change in 
organizational capability as measured by the change in the number of freight trips. We also found a 
negative and significant relationship between the percentage of archived goals and the number of fright 
trips which does not support proposition 6.  Overall, we found that pressure for change increases the 
likelihood to learn as indicated by changes in capability.  
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  Α2 the coefficient of the lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1 is our measure of organizational 
inertia and shows a negative and significant relationship with learning from changes in capabilities ΔY.  
This is in the expected direction and shows support for proposition 1, which states that inertia, has a 
negative effect on organizational learning. We found that the lag in organizational capabilities in terms of 
passenger expenses has a significant negative relationship with the number of freight trips. We also found 
most of the measures of organizational inertia were negative although not significant. Since the negative 
signs are in the hypothesized direction, for an exploratory study such as ours, we feel this supports 
proposition 1, overall.   We summarize that since SRO did show lags in the changes in its capabilities, 
SRO seems to have structural inertia. Overall, we found that Inertia has a negative relationship with 
changes in Organizational capability, which is an important component, contributing to liability of 
renewal. 
Table 7: The Saudi Railway Company SAR, the Result of Equation 2 
Δ Yt,  Ut 
 + + + + + + + + 
ΔZt N.W.F Bud N.F.T Bud N.F.C Bud S Bud 
T.F 2.183 -1.878 1.064 .433 -.999 .110 -3.107 3.005 
F.R 1.512 -2.067 .737 -.467 -.692 -.690 -.2.152 1.315 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 7, includes the relationship between changes in organization performance ΔZt by changes in 
learning ΔYt and legitimacy Ut at SAR. In this table, the results of the regression analysis are displayed. 
This study found some positive relationships between changes in organization performance and changes 
in organizational capabilities and this result supports proposition 2, which states that organizational 
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learning as understood by changes in organizational capabilities has a positive relationship with changes 
in performance. 
    In looking at Table 7 in more detail, we found that an increase in learning from changes in 
capabilities has a positive and significant relationship with the performance variable. We found some 
negative but not significant relationships, so overall we found that changes in organization capabilities, as 
an indication of the dynamics of organizational learning is indeterminate with support to changes in 
performance. 
The result in Table 7 also is indeterminate for proposition 3, which states that legitimacy has a 
positive relationship with changes in performance. So overall, we conclude that legitimacy has an 
indeterminate relationship with changes in performance.  
Table 8: The Saudi Railway Organization SRO, the Result of Equation 2 
Δ Yt,  Ut 
 + + + + + + + + + + + + 
ΔZt N.W.F Bud N.F.T Bud N.P.T Bud N.F.C Bud N.P.C Bud S Bud 
P .415 -.183 -.099 -.181 -.154 -.147 .236 -.271 .224 -.248 -.104 -.126 
C .472 .148 .438 .176 -.005 .157 .490 -.041 .045 .141 .362 -.018 
TF -.120 .268 .661** .296 -.547* .369 -.447 .446 .240 .189 -.460 .487 
P.R .149 -.093 .032 -.088 .184 -.124 -.449 .091 -.730** .145 -.034 -.073 
F.R .376 -.012 -.417 -.283 .117 -.285 -.372 -.114 -.77** -.016 .083 -.303 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Also for SRO we examine the second equation in table 8, which includes the relationship between 
changes in organization performance ΔZt by changes in learning ΔYt and legitimacy Ut.  
In table 8, the results of the regression analysis are displayed. We  found a significant (<0.1or <0.5) 
and positive relationship between changes in organization capabilities and changes in organizational 
performance and this result supports proposition 2, which states that organizational learning as 
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understood by changes in organizational capabilities has a positive relationship with changes in 
performance. In more detail, we found that increases in learning from changes in capabilities in terms of 
changes in the number of freight trips has a positive and significant relationship with the performance 
variable as measured by changes in the tons of freight. 
We also found a negative and significant relationship between the changes in organizational learning 
as measured by number of passenger trips and tons of freight as an indicator of performance. This result 
shows that there is a difference between both operations of freight and passenger, since both operations 
will use common resources, such as track and signal system, which may result in a tradeoff between 
freight and passenger operations. Also we found a negative and significant relationship between the 
changes in organizational learning measured by passenger cars with the passenger and freight revenue. 
All these negative relations do not support proposition 2. We discuss possible explanations for these 
results in our discussion section. However, overall we conclude that organizational capabilities have a 
positive relationship with changes in the organizational performance. 
The result in Table 8 weakly supports proposition 3, which states that legitimacy has a positive 
relationship with changes in performance. So overall, we conclude that legitimacy has a positive 
relationship with changes in performance.  
Table 9: The Saudi Railway Company SAR, the Result of Equation 3 
  Δ Zt , ΔUt 
 - - - - 
ΔXt T.F Bud F.R Bud 
% Achi .911 .127 .684 .830 
F.Ex -.533 -.562 -.400 -.973 
R.F.Acc 1.139 -.229 .855 .650 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
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Table 9, includes the relationship between the changes in pressure for change ΔXt with changes in 
organization performance ΔZt and changes in legitimacy ΔUt at SAR. Our study found negative 
relationships between the changes in pressure for change with changes in organization performance. This 
supports proposition 4, which states changes in performance has a negative relationship with changes in 
pressure for change. Although we found some positive relations which does not support proposition 4, we 
can conclude that overall, we found weakly support that change in performance has a negative 
relationship with pressure for change. Again, we will address some potential explanations for our result 
later.    
Our results as reported in Table 9 also support proposition 5, which states that changes in legitimacy 
has a negative relationship with changes in pressure for change. Changes in legitimacy, (the budget paid 
by the government), has a negative but not significant relationship with changes in pressure for change as 
a measured by freight expenses and the ratio of freight accidents. We found an equal number of positive 
and negative relationships which do not support proposition 5. Overall, we found that our results are 
indeterminate for proposition 5. 
   Table 10 includes the relationship between the changes in pressure for change ΔXt with changes in 
organization performance ΔZt and changes in legitimacy ΔUt at SRO. Our study found a significant 
(<0.1or <0.5) and negative relationship between the changes in pressure for change with changes in 
organization performance. This supports proposition 4, which states that changes in performance has a 
negative relationship with changes in pressure for change.  
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Table 10: The Saudi Railway Organization SRO, the Result of Equation 3 
Δ Zt , ΔUt 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
ΔXt P Bud C Bud TF Bud FR Bud PR Bud 
%Ach .142 -.100 -.245 -.151 -.536* -.090 .489 -.407 .284 -.164 
F.EX .246 .332 .032 .353 -.236 .346 .958** -.270 -.500* .471 
P.EX -.086 -.006 -.120 -.039 .369 -.012 -.044 .018 -.034 .009 
R.F.Ac -.154 -.084 .202 -.030 .341 -.094 -.067 -.049 .994** -.048** 
R.P.Ac -.204 .139 .157 .166 -.114 .129 -.039 .153 1.014** -.439* 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
In examining Table 10 in more detail, we found that changes in performance as measured by changes 
in the tons of freight  has a negative and significant relationship with changes in pressure for change as 
measured by changes in the percentage of archived goals. We also found that changes in performance as 
measured by the passenger revenue have a negative and significant relationship with the change in 
pressure for change as measured by the freight expenses.   
A significant but positive relationship can be seen between the changes in performance measured by 
the changes of freight revenue with the changes in pressure for change as measured by freight expenses. 
This may be related to the accounting point of view that whenever revenue increases expenses also 
increases. We also see this with the positive but insignificant relationship between changes in passenger 
revenue with change in pressure for change as measured by the ratios of both passenger and freight 
accidents. These relationships do not support proposition 4. Overall, however we found that change in 
performance has a negative relationship with pressure for change.     
    Our results as reported in Table 10 also support proposition 5, which states that changes in 
legitimacy has a negative relationship with changes in pressure for change. We found that changes in 
legitimacy as measured by changes in the budget has a negative and significant relationship with the 
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changes in pressure for change as measured by the ratios of both Freight and passenger accidents. Again 
as exploratory study, we feel this sign is in the predicted direction and shows support for proposition 5. 
 
- Pre-SAR Entry Analysis 
In the following tables we show the results for SRO operations from 2001- 2005 which is the period 
of pre-SAR entry.  
Table 11: SRO 2001-2005, the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 1 
Xt, Yt-1 
 + - + - + - + - + - 
ΔYt %Achi  Yt-1 F.Ex Yt-1 P. Ex Yt-1 R.F.acc Yt-1 R.P.acc Yt-1 
N.W.F -.912 -.058 .380 -.974 .306 -.945 .437 -.789 .335 -.749 
N.F.T -.380 .155 1.147 -.772 1.235 -.939 .863 -.281 .719 -.350 
N.P.T .312 -.778 -.865* -1.746** -1.254** -2.155** -.406 -1.216* -.318 -1.164 
N.F.C -1.029 -.097 -1.356* 1.375* -1.261 1.229** -3.853 4.122 -1.332 1.580 
N.P.C .014 -.528 -17.714 17.173 4.308 -4.805 .129 -.637 .873 -1.248 
S .549 .899 1.548 2.343 2.872 3.636 -1.381 -.450 -.713 .180 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 11, shows the result for proposition 1 and 6 for SRO for the period of per-SAR entry, which 
includes the relationship between changes in organizational capabilities as an indicator of learning with 
ΔY as the dependent variable when regressed on the α2 the coefficient of the lag of organizational 
capability using Yt-1   and the pressure for change Xt as the independent variables. As we noted in our 
model α2 the coefficient of Yt-1 is an indicator for organizational inertia. In this table, the results of 
regression analysis are displayed. The study found a positive relationship between changes in learning 
and pressure for change which supports proposition 6. This indicates that pressure for change has a 
positive effect on organizational learning.   
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       By looking at Table 11 in more detail, we found that some measures for pressure for change have 
a positive but not significant effect on the change in organizational capability. We conclude that, there is a 
positive relationship between changes in organizational capabilities as an indicator of learning using ΔY 
as the dependent variable when regressed on the lag of organizational capability as Yt-1   and the pressure 
for change Xt as the independent variables.    
We also found a negative and significant relationship between the freight expenses and the number of 
passenger trips and the number of the freight cars which does not support proposition 6. The passenger 
expenses at SRO as a measure of pressure for change has a negative and significant effect on the number 
of passenger trips as an indicator of changes in organizational capabilities. Overall, we found that 
pressure for change increases the likelihood to learn as indicated by changes in capability.  
  A2 the coefficient of the lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1 is our measure of organizational 
inertia and shows a negative and significant relationship with learning from changes in capabilities ΔY.  
This is in the expected direction and shows support for proposition 1, which states that inertia, has a 
negative effect on organizational learning.  
On the one hand, we found that the Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1 as an indicator of 
organizational inertia as measured by freight expenses has a negative and significant relationship with the 
number of passenger trips as a measure of changes in organizational capabilities. We also found that the 
lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1   as our indicator of organizational inertia as measured by passenger 
expenses has a negative and significant relationship with the number of passenger trips as a measure of 
changes in organizational capabilities. Also we found that, the Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1   as 
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our indicator of organizational inertia as measured by the ratio of freight accident has a negative and 
significant relationship with the number of passenger trips as a measure of changes in organizational 
capabilities.  
On the other hand, we found that the lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1   as our indicator of 
organizational inertia as measured by freight and passenger expenses have a positive and significant 
relationship with the number of freight cars as a measure of changes in organizational capabilities. This 
finding does not support proposition 1, however, the other results showed negative effects which support 
proposition 1.  
Table 12: SRO 2001-2005 the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 2 
Δ Yt,  Ut 
 + + + + + + + + + + + + 
ΔZt N.W.F Bud N.F.T Bud N.P.T Bud N.F.C Bud N.P.C Bud S Bud 
P 1.050 -.220 .426 .283 -.786 .709 -.263 .523 .836 .223 -.075 -.075 
C 1.354** 1.368** -.246 -.225 -.924 -.188 .276 -.351 .981 -.758 .473 .044 
TF .343 .646 .436 .626 -.291 .956 -.315 .887 .310 .777 -.739 .237 
P.R -.587 1.255 .571 .471 .348 .754 -.479 .780 -.368 .968 -1.006 -.072 
F.R -.779 1.342 .530 .443 .488 .672 -.459 .729 -.517 .973 -.942 -.067 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 12, includes the relationship between changes in organization performance ΔZt by changes in 
learning ΔYt and legitimacy Ut for SRO for the period of per-SAR entry. In this table, the results of the 
regression analysis are displayed. This study found a significant (<0.1or <0.5) and positive relationship 
between changes in organization performance and changes in organizational capabilities and this result 
weakly supports proposition 2, which states that organizational learning as understood by changes in 
organizational capabilities has a positive relationship with changes in performance. 
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In more details, we found that increases in learning from changes in capabilities as measured in terms 
of changes in number of wagons for freight has a positive and significant relationship with the 
performance variable as measured by changes in the number of containers. This result supports 
proposition 2.  
 For proposition 3 we found that legitimacy as measured by the budget of SRO has a positive 
relationship with performance as measured by the number of containers. This finding supports 
proposition 3. 
We also found a negative and not significant relationship between learning from changes in 
organizational capabilities and legitimacy with performance. All these negative relationships do not 
support proposition 2 and 3. However, overall we conclude that learning from changes in organizational 
capabilities and legitimacy has a positive relationship with performance. 
Table 13: SRO 2001-2005 the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 3 
Δ Zt , ΔUt 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
ΔXt P Bud C Bud TF Bud FR Bud PR Bud 
%Ach -.420 -.552 -.778* -.467 .046 -.651 .460 -.615 .546 -.590 
F.EX -.426 .094 -.870 -.031 ..660 -.385 .971* -.137 .940 -.175 
P.EX -.109 -.192 -.958 -.002 .494 -.334 .928 -.139 .870 -.167 
R.F.Ac .638 .295 .992 -.180 -.505 -.282 .882 .210 .938 .180 
R.P.Ac -.501 .498 -.932* .600 .058 .379 .656 .454 .552 .424 
      ** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 13 includes the relationship between the changes in pressure for change ΔXt with changes in 
organization performance ΔZt and changes in legitimacy ΔUt. Our study found a significant (<0.1or <0.5) 
and negative relationship between the changes in pressure for change with changes in organization 
performance. This weakly supports proposition 4, which states that changes in performance has a 
negative relationship with changes in pressure for change.  
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In examining Table 13 in more detail, we found that changes in performance as measured by changes 
in the number of containers has a negative and significant relationship with changes in pressure for 
change as measured by changes in the percentage of archived goals and the ratio of passenger accidents. 
These findings weakly support proposition 4.  
A significant but positive relationship can be seen between the changes in performance as measured 
by the changes of freight revenue with the changes in pressure for change as measured by freight 
expenses. This may be related to the accounting point of view that whenever revenue increases expenses 
also increases. This relationship does not support proposition 4. Overall, however we found that changes 
in performance have a negative relationship with pressure for change.     
    Our results as reported in Table 13 support proposition 5, which states that changes in legitimacy 
has a negative relationship with changes in pressure for change. We found that changes in legitimacy as 
measured by changes in the budget have a negative but not significant relationship with the changes in 
pressure for change. Again as exploratory study, we feel this sign is in the predicted direction shows 
support for proposition 5. 
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- Post-SAR Entry 2006-2014  
In the following tables we show the results of SRO operations from 2006- 2014 which is the period of 
post-SAR entry.  
Table 14: SRO 2006-2014 the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 1 
Xt, Yt-1 
 + - + - + - + - + - 
ΔYt %Achi  Yt-1 F.Ex Yt-1 P. Ex Yt-1 R.F.acc Yt-1 R.P.acc Yt-1 
N.W.F -.310 -.654* .229 -.644* -.293 -.730* .604 -.324 .350 -.429 
N.F.T -.537 -.134 -.640 -.764 .076 -.227 -.275 -.251 -.735** -.290 
N.P.T .100 .398 .532 .842 .567 .656 -.217 .407 .064 .425 
N.F.C -.534 .211 -.695 -.575 .119 .052 -.172 -.014 -.575 .009 
N.P.C .042 -.229 -1.201** -1.181** .739 .232 -.678* -.091 -.785** -.006 
S .239 -.302 -.154 -.375 -.298 -.334 .015 -.252 .104 -.214 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 14, shows the result for proposition 1 and 6 for SRO for the period of post-SAR entry,  which 
includes the relationship between changes in organizational capabilities as an indicator of learning using 
ΔY as the dependent variable when regressed on the lag of organizational capability using  Yt-1   and the 
pressure for change Xt as the independent variables. As we noted in our model, α2 the coefficient of Yt-1   
is an indicator for organizational inertia. In this table, the results of regression analysis are displayed. The 
study found positive but not significant relationships between learning from changes in organizational 
capability with pressure for change which weakly supports proposition 6. We conclude that pressure for 
change has a positive effect on organizational learning.   
Also we found negative and significant relationships between learning from changes in 
organizational capability and pressure for change which does not supports proposition 6. We found a 
negative and significant relationship between the freight expenses and the number of passenger cars 
which does not support proposition 6. The ratio of freight accident at SRO which measures the pressure 
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for change has negative and significant effect on the number passenger cars as a measure of learning from 
changes in organizational capabilities. We also found that, the ratio of passenger accident as a measure of 
pressure for change has a negative and significant relationship with number of freight trips and the 
number of passenger cars. Overall, however we found that pressure for change increases the likelihood to 
learn as indicated by changes in capability.  
 A2 the coefficient of Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1 is our measure of organizational inertia 
and shows a negative and significant relationship with learning from changes in capabilities ΔY.  This is 
in the expected direction and shows support for proposition 1, which states that inertia, has a negative 
effect on organizational learning.  We found that the Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1   as our 
indicator of organizational inertia as measured by percentage of achieved goals has a negative and 
significant relationship with the number of wagons of freight as a measure of changes in organizational 
capabilities. We also found that the Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1   as an indicator of 
organizational inertia by freight expenses has a negative and significant relationship with the number of 
wagons for freight and the number of passenger cars as measures of changes in organizational capabilities.  
We found that the Lag in organizational capabilities Yt-1   as our indicator of organizational inertia 
has a positive but not significant relationship with changes in organizational capabilities. These findings 
do not support proposition 1, however, the other results showed the predicted negative effects which 
support proposition 1. 
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Table 15: SRO 2006-2014 the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 2 
Δ Yt,  Ut 
 + + + + + + + + + + + + 
ΔZt N.W.F Bud N.F.T Bud N.P.T Bud N.F.C Bud N.P.C Bud S Bud 
P .301 .406 -.366 .260 -.516 .358 -.326 .361 -.516 .358 .227 .232 
C .560 .040 .643 -.177 .043 -.213 .806** -.417 .111 -.222 .363 -.273 
TF -.608 -.217 .515 .070 -.889** .236 .106 .021 .366 -.010 -252 .096 
P.R .636 .573 -.372 .280 .106 273 -.324 .381 -.818** .427 .084 .280 
F.R .415 .050 -.744* -.178 .026 -.152 -.727* .045 -.900** -.003 .078 -.162 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 15, includes the relationship between changes in organization performance ΔZt regressed on 
learning from changes in in organizational capability ΔYt and legitimacy Ut for SRO for the period of 
post-SAR entry. In this table, the results of the regression analysis are displayed. This study found a 
significant (<0.1or <0.5) and positive relationship between changes in organization performance and 
changes in organizational capabilities and this result supports proposition 2, which states that 
organizational learning as understood as changes in organizational capabilities has a positive relationship 
with changes in performance. 
In more detail, we found that increases in learning from changes in capabilities as measured in terms 
of changes in number of freight cars has a positive and significant relationship with the performance 
variable as measure by changes in the number of containers. This result supports proposition 2.  
We also found a negative but not significant relationship between learning from changes in 
organizational capabilities with performance. We found that increases in learning from changes in 
capabilities as measured in terms of changes in number of freight trips has a negative and significant 
relationship with the performance variable as measure by changes in the freight revenue. Also we found 
that increases in learning from changes in capabilities measured by the number of passenger trips has a 
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negative  and significant relationship with the performance variable as measure by changes in the tons of 
freight. We also found that increases in learning from changes in capabilities as measured in terms of 
changes in the number of freight cars has a negative and significant relationship with the performance 
variable as measure by changes in the freight revenue. We found that increases in learning from changes 
in capabilities as measured by changes in the number of passenger cars has a negative and significant 
relationship with the performance variable as measure by changes in the passenger and freight revenue.  
All these negative relationships do not support proposition 2. Overall, however we conclude that learning 
from changes in organizational capabilities and legitimacy have positive relationship with performance. 
For proposition 3 we found that legitimacy as measured by the budget of SRO has a positive 
relationship with performance as measured by the number of containers. This finding supports 
proposition 3. 
Table 16: SRO 2006-2014 the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 3 
Δ Zt, ΔUt 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
ΔXt P Bud C Bud TF Bud FR Bud PR Bud 
%Ach -.905 .896 -.417 -.067 -.683 -.167 .467 -.302 -.452 .361 
F.EX .147 .463 .306 .708 -.242 .503 .938 -.192 .252 .442 
P.EX 1.765** -.1599** -.043 -.040 .389 .122 -.942 .765 -.931* .536 
R.F.Ac -.639 .312 .433 -.097 .068 -.233 .292 -.502 1.128** -.936** 
R.P.Ac -.1.391 1.778 .309 .228 -.562 -1.379 .003 .110 1.077** -.535 
** indicate sg at 0.05, * indicate sg at 0.1 
Table 16 includes the relationship between the changes in pressure for change using ΔXt with 
changes in organization performance ΔZt and changes in legitimacy ΔUt. Our study found a significant 
(<0.1or <0.5) and negative relationship between the changes in pressure for change with changes in 
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organizational performance. This weakly supports proposition 4, which states changes in performance has 
a negative relationship with changes in pressure for change.  
In examining Table 16 in more detail, we found that changes in performance as measured by changes 
in the passenger revenue has a negative and significant relationship with changes in pressure for change 
as measured by changes passenger expenses. Although this finding supports proposition 4, we also found 
a positive and significant relationships which can be seen between the changes in performance as 
measured by the changes in number of passenger with the changes in pressure for change as measured by 
passenger expenses. Also we found a positive and significant relationship between the changes in 
performance as measured by the changes of the passenger revenue with the changes in pressure for 
change as measured by the ratio of freight and passenger accident. This relationship does not support 
proposition 4. Overall, however we found that change in performance has a negative relationship with 
pressure for change.     
    Our results as reported in Table 16 also weakly supports proposition 5, which states that changes in 
legitimacy has a negative relationship with changes in pressure for change. We found that changes in 
legitimacy as measured by changes in the budget have a negative and significant relationship with the 
changes in pressure for change as measured by passenger expenses. We also found that changes in 
legitimacy as measured by changes in the budget have a negative and significant relationship with the 
changes in pressure for change as measured by the ratio of freight accidents. We feel this sign is in the 
predicted direction and shows support for proposition 5. 
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2- Discussion 
1- General Results Discussion  
As an exploratory study we found partial support for our model and propositions. Through our use of 
differences variable regressions analysis, we tested our model as it was expressed in the series of 
difference equations.    
Although the time series of SAR is short, we found that all relationships are as we expected and the 
results were the same hypothesized direction as in our model.  The results didn’t show significance which 
can be explained in that our model may not sensitive enough to be able to show significant relationships if 
the time series is short. By following the result of SAR we summarize as follow; we found both positive 
relationships between pressure for change and learning from changes in organizational capability. Also 
we found that learning from changes in organizational capability has positive effect on performance. And 
legitimacy has a positive effect on performance. Performance and legitimacy have, however, a negative 
relationship on the pressure for change. These results show, that SAR as a startup organization is 
developing and surviving the period of liability of newness. It is true that our model is mainly focus on 
the old established organization with a long period of time as well as with liability of renewal, but we can 
show partial support for a new organization experiencing liability of newness. For future studies we aim 
to include a large group of new companies’ capabilities, performance, legitimacy and pressure for change 
variables to measure the ability of overcoming liability of newness.     
    On the one hand, and as can be seen in our results, SRO has difficulties in overcoming the liability 
of renewal through changing its capabilities as indicated by the structure inertia seen over the time series 
from 2001-2014. 
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 On the other hand, our results show partial support for our model, and it seems that SRO has changed 
some of it capabilities especially in the freight sector which has allowed SRO to learn from the changes 
and as a result improve its performance. This was indicated by the positive relationships between 
organizational learning and performance. We also noted that there are positive relationships between 
legitimacy and performance in our model. This study found that both performance and legitimacy have a 
negative relationship on the pressure for change. Whenever SRO has low performance and/or loss of 
legitimacy we found an increase in pressure for change, which in turn affects SRO learning as seen in 
changes in capabilities positively.  
We found that the more data over a long period of time we have, the more significance we found. 
This shows that with less data and short period of time we may not get significance as can be seen in the 
SAR case. In the analysis of the per-and post SAR entry, we used more data and a shorter period of time 
for pre SAR entry of 4 years and 9 years after SAR entry. We found that SRO was affected by the 
environmental changes which were caused by the SAR entry. This finding is discussed in the following 
discussion. 
2- SRO the Period of Pre and Post SAR Entry Discussion 
In this section of our discussion, we re-examine the periods of pre and post SAR entry in the 
result section from table 11 to table 16. Our re-examination shows the overall significant, insignificant 
supported and unsupported results.  We denoted S if the result is significant and supported. US if the 
result is significant and unsupported, N/R S if result is not significant but supported and finally N/R 
US if the result is not significant and unsupported.   
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Table 17: SRO the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 1 
ΔYt Xt Yt-1 
S 0 3 
US 3 2 
N/R S 16 17 
N/R US 11 8 
Tables 17 and 18 discuss the result shown in table 11 and 14 in which we showed that Xt the pressure 
for change has a positive relationship with ΔYt learning from changes in organizational capability.   Also 
α2 the coefficient of Yt-1 the lag of changes in organizational capability as an indicator of inertia has a 
negative relationship with ΔYt learning from changes in organizational capability. 
We found that pressure for change has no significant but supported results with learning for changes 
in organizational capability.  This shows that SRO used to have a low degree of pressure for change in its 
capability before SAR entry. At the same time the result shows that SRO used to have a high degree of 
inertia in both passenger and freight operations. This finding can explain the reason behind the entry of 
SAR.  
Table 18: SRO the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 1 
ΔYt Xt Yt-1 
S 0 4 
US 4 0 
N/R S 14 17 
N/R US 12 9 
Again we found that pressure for change has no significant but supported results with learning from 
changes in organizational capability which means that SRO does not have much pressure to change.  But 
the degree of inertia increases as a result of ineffective change in the organizational capability.   
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Table 19: SRO the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 2 
ΔZt ΔYt Ut 
S 1 1 
US 0 0 
N/R S 13 21 
N/R US 16 8 
 
Tables 19 and 20 discuss the result shown in table 12 and 15 in which we showed ΔYt learning from 
changes in organizational capability and Ut legitimacy have a positive relationship with ΔZt changes in 
performance. 
 This table shows that both SRO’s learning from changes in organizational capability and legitimacy 
are affecting its performance positively.  Learning from changes in organizational capability at SRO 
shows a low degree of performing well by learning from changes in organizational capability. At the 
same time legitimacy affects its performance which shows that SRO cannot perform well without the 
budget paid by the government.  
Table 20: SRO the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 2 
ΔZt ΔYt Ut 
S 1 0 
US 4 0 
N/R S 16 19 
N/R US 9 11 
Again table 20 shows that both SRO learning from changes in organizational capability and 
legitimacy are affecting its performance positively. The performance improved by learning from changes 
in organizational capability in the post SAR entry period. Also legitimacy keeps its effect on performance 
which shows that SRO cannot perform well without the budget paid by the government. 
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Table 21: SRO the Period of Pre-SAR Entry Equation 3 
ΔXt ΔZt ΔUt 
S 2 0 
US 1 0 
N/R S 7 16 
N/R US 15 9 
Tables 21 and 22 discuss the results shown in table 13 and 16 in which we showed that ΔZt changes in 
organizational performance and ΔUt changes in legitimacy have a negative relationship with ΔXt changes 
in pressure for change. 
In the pre SAR entry, as can be seen in table 21, changes in performance at SRO show more negative 
and significant relationships which mean that SRO’s low performance pushed the government to put 
more offers to develop it. Also changes in legitimacy can be seen as another factor that caused pressure 
for change, since the budget paid by the government was lower in pre SAR period than the post period of 
SAR entry. 
Table 22: SRO the Period of Post-SAR Entry Equation 3 
ΔXt ΔZt ΔUt 
S 1 2 
US 3 0 
N/R S 10 10 
N/R US 11 13 
In table 21 shows that changes in legitimacy in the post SAR entry start to show more pressure for 
change than in the pre SAR entry period. Although changes in performance have less pressure for change 
we still think that both changes in performance and legitimacy are the main source of pressure for change 
in our model.  
We conclude that the environmental changes whether pre- or post SAR entry has shown partial 
support for our model. We think that as an exploratory study we have chosen relevant measures of our 
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variables as can be seen in the Table 4 in page 57, to test our propositions. Although these variables were 
selected carefully in our study, we cannot completely rule out that these measures could be interpreted as 
multi-variables’ measures.   However we are confident that these measures show valid results. In future 
studies we will select and develop more measures to expand our confidence.  
 As a weakness of this study, we tried to measure changes in organizational capabilities as an 
indicator of organizational learning which means that we didn’t measure the learning process directly. In 
the future we will need to develop more direct measures of organizational learning. We tried to measure 
inertia based on the lag of changes in organizational capabilities which also means that we didn’t measure 
inertia directly.   
We consider the limitation of the time series to 13 years for SRO and 3 years for SAR as another 
constraint of our study. We will collect more data over time to increase the data available to examine our 
variables.  Although we were unable to measure the whole model simultaneously, we were able to 
measure all the expected relationships between variables as shown in each of the equations. Therefore we 
find preliminary support for our model. In the future, with more data and more refined measures of our 
variables, we will conduct a simultaneous equation examination of our model. 
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Appendix 1  
Requested data from SRO 2001-2014 
Variable names Variable 
code  
definition of variables / Operationalization of variables 
Number of wagons 
for freight  
 
N.W.F 
Yearly No. of wagons of 
freight   at SRO  
No. of freight wagons per single trip *No. of total freight trips 
per year  
Number of freight 
trips 
 
N.F.T 
Yearly No. of freight trips at 
SRO  
No. of total trips per year/ No. of freight wagons per single train 
Number of 
passenger trips 
N.P.T Yearly No. of Passenger trips  Reserved No of passenger trips   
Number of freight 
cars 
 
N.F.C 
Total No. of freight cars in 
each year at SRO  
Added No. of freight cars in each year  
Number of 
passenger cars 
 
N.PC 
No. of passenger cars in each 
year 
Added No. of passenger cars in each year  
The number of 
staff 
 
S 
Total number staff  at SRO 
each year 
Added No. of staff in each year. 
Number of 
passenger 
P Total number of passenger 
each year  
Registered No. of passengers in each year. 
Number of 
container  
C  Total number of container 
each year  
Registered No. of containers in each year. 
Tons of freight  T.F  Yearly tons of freight at SRO  Registered tons of freight in each year. 
Passenger revenue  P.R   Revenue of passenger 
operation for each year 
Registered passenger revenue for operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO. 
Freight revenue  F.R   Revenue of Freight operation  
at SRO for each year 
Registered freight revenue for operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO. 
Percentage of 
achieved goals  
% Ach G      Percentage of achieved goal 
each year at SRO  
% of achieved goal from the financial statement of SRO in each 
year.   
Freight expenses  F.EX Expenses of freight operation 
at SRO for each year  
Registered freight expenses for operation in each year from the 
financial statement of SRO 
Passenger 
expenses  
P.EX Expenses of passenger 
operation at SRO for each 
year 
Registered passenger expenses for operation in each year from 
the financial statement of SRO. 
Ratio of freight 
accident  
R. F.Ac Ratio of freight accidents at 
SRO for each year. 
No. of total freight trips per year/% of total accident per year 
Ratio of passenger 
accident 
R. P.Ac Ratio of passenger accidents 
for each year 
No. of total passenger trips per year/% of total accident per year 
Budget  Bud Budget paid by the 
government and investors for 
each company SRO 
The amount of money paid by the government year from the 
yearly  financial statement of SRO 
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Appendix 2 
Requested data from SAR 2011-2014 
Variable names Variable 
code  
definition of variables / Operationalization of variables 
Number of wagons 
for freight  
 
N.W.F 
Yearly No. of wagons of freight   at 
SAR 
No. of freight wagons per single trip *No. of total freight 
trips per year  
Number of freight 
trips 
 
N.F.T 
Yearly No. of freight trips at SAR  No. of total trips per year/ No. of freight wagons per 
single train 
Number of freight 
cars 
 
N.F.C 
Total No. of freight cars in each 
year at SAR 
Added No. of freight cars in each year  
The number of 
staff 
 
S 
Total number staff  at SAR each 
year 
Added No. of staff in each year. 
Tons of freight  T.F  Yearly tons of freight at SAR  Registered tons of freight in each year. 
Freight revenue  F.R   Revenue of Freight operation  at 
SAR for each year 
Registered freight revenue for operation in each year from 
the financial statement of SAR. 
Percentage of 
achieved goals  
% Ach G      Percentage of achieved goal each 
year at SAR 
% of achieved goal from the financial statement of SAR 
in each year.   
Freight expenses  F.EX Expenses of freight operation at 
SAR for each year  
Registered freight expenses for operation in each year 
from the financial statement of SAR 
Ratio of freight 
accident  
R. F.Ac Ratio of freight accidents at SAR 
for each year. 
No. of total freight trips per year/% of total accident per 
year 
Budget  Bud Budget paid by the government 
and investors for each company 
SAR 
The amount of money paid by the government year from 
the yearly  financial statement of SAR 
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Appendix 3 
The author’s request letter to collect data from SRO 
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Appendix 4 
The permission letter from the Minister of Transportation 
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Appendix 5 
Written permission from the Minister of Transportation 
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Appendix 6 
The author’s request letter and the written permission from the CEO of SAR 
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Appendix 7 
 The request letter from the author’s advisor, Professor Methe’ 
 
  
